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Title: The Colourful American Opportunity   
Author: Mariana Rocha Mota Martins Contreiras 
The Colourful American Opportunity analyses the strategic turning point of a 
Portuguese acrylic fibre producer – Fisipe, in 2005. Whilst, internally, Fisipe was 
changing its strategy from mainly focusing on product to focusing more on the client, 
driven by the specifications of its new technology on colour fibre, externally the acrylic 
industry was giving signs of contraction resulting in acrylic producer’s closures. In this 
context, Fisipe conducted a market research to assess profitable sectors when it 
foresees an attractive opportunity to supply with colour fibre one of the biggest 






Título: The Colourful American Opportunity   
Autor: Mariana Rocha Mota Martins Contreiras 
The Colourful American Opportunity refere-se ao ponto de viragem na estratégia 
corporativa de um fabricante português de fibra acrílica – Fisipe, em 2005. Ao mesmo 
tempo que a empresa mudava a sua estratégia interna de produção para stock para 
uma produção direcionada ao cliente, em grande parte exigida pela introdução da 
nova tecnologia, a fibra de cor, externamente a indústria acrílica dava sinais de 
recessão resultando na extinção de fabricantes desta fibra. Neste contexto, a Fisipe 
realiza estudos de mercado a fim de determinar sectores atrativos quando surge a 
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The following dissertation presents managerial and strategic dilemmas of a company in 
a specific point in time. The aim of the present work is to produce a case that can be 
used as a teaching vehicle in class, through the deployment of a critical sense and 
analytical skills in the reader. This thesis is divided mainly in a Case Study, a Literature 
Review and a Teaching Note. 
In the Case Study section the reader is confronted with the reality where Fisipe was 
operating in 2005 and some of the company legacy. Important facts to illustrate the 
situation where the protagonists were involved and their conflicts are presented. From 
the case study it is possible to extract strategic themes worth of reflection and 
analysis.  
The approach followed in the Literature Review was to focus on specific topics related 
to the company and its sector, in contrast to general academic reviews in business 
strategy.  The result is a compilation of findings from academic literature on the 
chosen strategic subjects.  
In the last section, the Teaching Note, a class plan with potential assignment questions 
is proposed, to guide a possible analysis on the case. The topics addressed in this 
analysis are open for discussion and concern the strategic implications of a company 
once operating in a mature and commodity type industry, the implementation of a 
challenging strategy in face of organizational culture obstacles and how to answer to a 
market opportunity while overcoming a damaged reputation. All the personal analysis 
developed on this section is one of many possibilities, since the teaching notes are 
living documents in constant evolution. 
The present thesis aims to provide lessons on the business strategy field by merging 
factual information provided on the case study, the knowledge acquired on the 


















II | CASE STUDY 
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In July 2005, José Miguel Contreiras – COO of Fisipe – was seated in a 9 hours Lisbon-      
-Newark TAP flight, together with Tiago Gonçalves – America and Africa Regional Sales 
Manager. They were finishing the last couple of slides to present at Coats and Clark1 
the next morning. Fisipe was having its second chance on supplying the largest 
American producer of Hand Knitting Yarn with gel dyed fibre. This was undoubtedly a 
great opportunity for Fisipe to build a new reputation and establish itself as a 
respectful supplier in the American market.  
1. FISIPE - history of the company  
FISIPE – Fibras Sintéticas de Portugal, S.A. was a 78 million €2 Portuguese producer of 
acrylic fibre based in Lavradio, Portugal (see exhibit 1). The company was incorporated 
in 1973, through a joint venture between CUF (Companhia União Fabril) with 60% of 
the capital and the Japanese firm Mitsubishi, represented by Mitsubishi Corporation 
(MC) and Mitsubishi Rayon Company (MRC), owning the remaining 40%. Fisipe entered 
in the acrylic fibre market in order to fulfil the gap in raw material supply (acrylic fibre) 
for the national textile industry (see exhibit 2). However, at an international level, the 
oil crisis and the consequent energy and raw material price inflation did not create a 
welcoming environment. Due to the social and economic consequences brought by the 
1974 Portuguese revolution, Fisipe only started its activity two years later, with a 
production capacity of 12.5000 ton/year. 
1.1. The take-off 
The introduction of Fisipe´s fibre into the national market was a success, mainly due to 
a pre-marketing strategy with fibre produced and imported from MRC. Thus, when 
Fisipe started producing its own fibre, whose characteristics were similar to the 
Japanese´s, its clients were already familiar with Fisipe´s product. However, the chaotic 
environment present in the country, still a consequence of the revolution, impaired 
Fisipe´s financial situation. Moreover, CUF was nationalized and renamed Quimigal. 
                                                          
1
 Coats and Clark – “America's #1 name in sewing and needlecraft products, is part of the world's largest 
textile/thread manufacturing company with products sold in over 150 countries for industrial and home 
use.” Source: http://www.coatsandclark.com/About+Coats/ 
2
 Sales volume in 2004.  
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In 1980, a project to increase production capacity to 23.000 ton/year was completed. 
The Portuguese Government authorization to proceed with this project was 
fundamental for the company to become a competitive European player. Nonetheless, 
Fisipe reported negative net losses until 1984, as a result of high debt and interest 
rates, as well as of the strong contraction felt in the European textile industry. 
1.2. The golden era (1984 to 1988) 
From 1984 onwards, and after two capital increases, Quimigal became owner of 
83.60% of Fisipe´s capital while the Mitsubishi group owned 16.40%.  
Meanwhile, Fisipe started to export its fibre, developing an international strategy for 
new markets; first to Spain and Italy and later to South Africa, Morocco, Kenia, Greece, 
Pakistan and Turkey.  A “golden” era was about to begin, as Fisipe´s CEO – João Dotti 
confirmed in an internal report: 
“We achieved the competitive conditions to survive by ourselves in the open market. 
Our fibre is more and more according to the market demands. All our forecasts in terms 
of net profit to 1986 are based on competitive prices at an European level. We continue 
to produce and promote fibre with greater added value, while having quality and 
innovation as our main concerns”. 
In 1987, three years after entering the Lisbon stock exchange, Fisipe opened its capital 
to its employees, reaching a market cap of 9 million€ for 1.9 million shares. At the end 
of this year, Fisipe´s production capacity reached 30.000 ton/year; nevertheless Fisipe 
was still a small player in comparison to other international competitors. The 
Portuguese market continued to be the most profitable one representing a market 
share around 75%. Yet this scenario was about to change, since the government 
decided to put an end to the custom´s protection that Fisipe had been enjoying that 
far.  As consequence, the company kept investing in a volume strategy, to assure its 
ability to compete at a global level, in the near future. 
1.3. Consolidation in the international markets. 
During the 90´s and first decade of the XXI century, the European and US acrylic 
markets suffered a recession. The forecast for the European acrylic market demand, 
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from the year 2005 to 2008, was a reduction to 1/5 of the year 2000 value (see exhibit 
3). This was a consequence of the huge imports of textiles from Asia, Turkey and 
Mexico allowed by international trade agreements, such as GATT3. As a result, the 
industry rivalry intensified and only 6 acrylic producers (in Western Europe and Turkey) 
kept its activity: AKSA in Turkey, Montefibre in Spain and Italy, Acordis in the UK, 
Dralon and Dolan in Germany, and Fisipe in Portugal (see exhibit 4). Fisipe, with a 
60.000 ton/year capacity, continued reinforcing its position as an exporter mainly 
outside of the European Economic Community (see exhibit 5). 
1.4. R&D 
Since Fisipe´s foundation there was a technology exchange agreement with MRC. Up 
to 1998, Fisipe only had know-how to produce a commodity fibre. At that time MRC 
was showing unwillingness to provide the Japanese know-how on modern, more 
complex and higher value added fibres – the specialities. Hence Fisipe decided to 
establish its own R&D structure and build a pilot line to develop specialities fibres. Ever 
since, the investment in R&D was established as a strategic component of the 
company.  
1.5. Acquisition of Acordis Barcelona - “One company, two plants”  
In 1997, Quimigal, the major shareholder, was privatized and Fisipe returned to be 
under the CUF umbrella, keeping the same management structure. 
In December 2000, CUF finished negotiations with an English competitor, Acordis 
Grimsby, to acquire Acordis Barcelona. Fisipes´ group already included Fisipe Lavradio, 
Fisipe Hungary (started in 1999) and the commercial society Munditextil (see exhibit 
6). 
With Barcelona, Fisipe was confirming its position as an international player. In 2000, It 
became the third largest European producer with a total of 126.000 ton/year capacity. 
The two plants complemented each other, in terms of products and markets; whilst, 
                                                          
3 GATT was signed in 1947 and lasted until 1994, when it was replaced by the World Trade 
Organization in 1995. GATT was a multilateral agreement regulating international trade. According to its 
preamble, its purpose was the "substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and the 
elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis." 
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Fisipe Barcelona was selling coloured fibre4, using a modern gel dyed technology, 
mainly to Spain and Egypt, Fisipe Lavradio supplied Asia, Middle East, Europe and Latin 
America and Africa with raw white and black commodities.  
1.6. Closures and industry restructuring 
After the nine eleven in 2001, the oil prices went up with an immediate impact on the 
raw materials and energy costs5.  The high energy and labour costs and the worldwide 
reduction of demand led Fisipe Barcelona and Fisipe Hungary to be economically 
unsustainable. As an anticipation measure to Fisipe Barcelona closure, in 2004, the gel 
dyed technology started to be developed in Fisipe´s Lavradio plant and for the 
following years, it was the player with the latest gel dyed technology6. One year later, 
Fisipe decided to close its factory in Hungary. Both closures meant huge losses to 
Fisipe Lavradio and a difficult financial situation to manage. 
The textile industry was suffering dramatic changes; many companies were leaving 
some markets while others were in fact, exiting the acrylic fibre business. As stated by 
Fisipe´s commercial director, José Miguel Contreiras: 
“We were sure that gel dyed fibre was the future, but we also knew that a lot was 
happening out there. At the end, it all comes to the question: What should we do to 
survive?” 
2. Events and opportunities until 2005 
2.1. Pressures in the Acrylic Fibre (AF) industry 
Polyester and Cotton  
The acrylic fibre industry was showing signs of maturity whilst it was suffering 
pressures. It was being challenged by its major substitutes - polyester and cotton. 
Polyester price was historically lower than acrylic ones, but over the years this gap was 
                                                          
4
 In the coloured acrylic fibre there were two production processes: the gel dyeing and the dope dyeing 
one. The gel dyeing process was characterized by short duration, a continuous mass production, a low 
colour deviation and a lowest water consumption. The gel dyed acrylic fibre had applications such as 
hand knitting yarn, carpets, and home textiles. 
5
 Acrylonitrile was the raw material to produce acrylic fibre which was directly correlated with the oil 
price.  
6




gradually increasing. Acrylic demand was growing slowly and losing market share for 
both substitutes (see exhibit 7 and exhibit 8). 
Acrylonitrile (AN)7 and Energy costs 
 The AF sector was consuming less AN due to its considerable cost, greatly influenced 
by the oil price volatility. In the last quarter of 2005 the acrylonitrile producers were 
confronted with a shortage in propylene, due to oil refinery cuts. As a consequence, 
Acrylonitrile prices increased which together with the substantial energy cost inflation 
(natural gas) pressured the AF production costs and margins (see exhibit 9 and Exhibit 
10). 
2.2 AF Demand and Capacity 
In 2005 the AF production was significantly higher in China and Western Europe when 
compared with other markets. Both regions dominated the global output. Since 2000, 
China and the Asian region were increasing capacity while America and Europe were 
gradually divesting (see exhibit 11). This fact was partly justified with the excess of 
Chinese demand over its production, which led to a need for greater imports and 
investments in domestic plants capacity. The European and American behaviour 
resulted from the challenging environment lived in the sector along with the 
contraction of these regions demand (see exhibit 12 and exhibit 13).  
Hence, many producers closed their plants during the early 2000´s. Mainly in the 
“western world” and Japan there was a capacity lost around 900 kt8, while in other 
regions, like China, there was an increase of 650 kt (see exhibit 14 and exhibit 15). The 
set of closures, together with a rise of market opportunities, with respect to clients 
undersupplied who were left in several markets, allowed the remaining players to raise 
their capacity utilisation rates, contributing to higher efficiency and profitability.  
 
                                                          
7
 Acrylonitrile (AN), as the most important raw material for Acrylic Fibre (AF) production, accounts 
around 80% of the total production costs for commodity fibre and 70% for special/coloured fibre. AN 
cost depends on propylene (major raw material) and oil prices (used to produce propylene). Natural gas, 
as an energetic cost, was the other substantial cost in AF production. 
8
 Kt = Kiloton, 1 kt = 1000 ton 
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3. Fisipe Strategy for 2005-2010 
Gradually, Fisipe evolved from a company producing basically standard textile fibre 
(raw white and raw black commodities), with a focus on cost rationalization (in energy 
and labour costs), to a producer of acrylic specialities fibres (see exhibit 16). Fisipe´s 
product portfolio was divided in two main types of fibres: a commodity fibre (raw 
white and raw black) with low differentiation and lower market value and the 
specialities (coloured/gel dyed and functional fibres) with higher value and complexity. 
Knitwear, hand knitting yarn and home decoration were some of the end uses for 
Fisipe´s acrylic fibre. 
The strategy outlined for 2005-2010 represented a clear turning point in the company 
(see exhibit 17); it stated a new cycle with a strong orientation toward the markets (a 
production directed to the client with specific attributes) opposed to a commodity-       
-base stock production policy. Internal changes were designed for all Fisipe´s 
departments, in order to change a predominant commodity textile culture to a more 
specialities and technical9 mindset. 
In HR a policy of staff renewal, through the recruitment of younger employees with 
higher formal education levels, was pursued. Moreover, agreements with universities, 
such as Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade do Minho among others, were 
established for new fibres´ functionality trials and also for recruiting to chemical areas. 
In addition, there was a great investment in the modernization of the equipment and 
its adaptation to specialities production.  
The investment in R&D was maintained, in order to innovate constantly in new 
products and processes, to become more competitive and follow the trend on 
technical applications.  Finally the communication flow between clients, agents, 
commercial division, operational division and managers was facilitated, in order to 
fasten the response to client´s requirements and enabling a higher customization. 
Internal training actions and partnerships with clients to promote new fibres aimed to 
                                                          
9
 Technical fibre (non-textile fibre) had applications in the automotive industry, road construction and 
building construction, among others. The fibre mixed with friction materials, bituminous and concrete 
improved the material´s resistance and durability. One of the end uses was to prevent road and building 
fissures.  Source: http://www.fisipe.pt/gca/index.php?id=69 
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expand the offer on the specialities and gradually to gain know how on the technical 
fibre. 
3.1 Mission 
Fisipe Strategic plan 2005-2010 stated that its mission was:  
“To create value for our shareholders by promoting the competitiveness of our clients 
through the development and valorisation of the most suitable acrylic fibres for the 
various consuming industries worldwide.” 
Fisipe´s goal was to become an international reference in the specialities. In order to 
achieve it, Fisipe focused on three main strategic vectors:  
 Dynamism in innovation, through a continuous research in new applications 
for acrylic fibre and a constant focus on the latest product demand;  
 Flexibility and operational efficiency aligned with process creativity and 
productivity gains; 
 Excellence In supply through the 6 c´s: competency, cooperation, 
communication, celerity, credibility and consistency. 
3.2 Positioning 
Fisipe positioned itself “as the supplier that has more proximity to the client”, which 
was reflected through a customer oriented policy present in all departments. Thus, 
Fisipe considered the identification and satisfaction of client´s requirements combined 
with the ambition to go further in client´s expectations as its main competitive 
advantage. The strategy was focused on providing a customized product supported by 
flexible logistics and a technical assistance to its client´s. Fisipe´s product was 
conceptualized in a broader view: the product itself (fibre), the service and the 
technical assistance. The company was committed with the value creation on these 
three dimensions.  
3.3 Clients 
Typically in the textile industry, clients had a considerable negotiation power over fibre 
producer´s. The tenuous differentiation among fibres, especially in commodities, cut 
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suppliers leeway. In 2005, Fisipe had 311 clients in 37 countries over the 5 continents 
(see exhibit 18 and exhibit 19). The company exported 95% of its sales, distributed as 
follows: 40% in the Euro area, Europe and Magrebe and 60% in Dollar area markets.  
Fisipe maintained a diversified client´s portfolio since the beginning of its existence, to 
spread the commercial risk; no client accounted for more than 10% of the total gross 
margin. Even with a wide and constant evolving client´s data base, the company had 
kept key clients in several sectors of the market, who constitute the “hard nucleus” 
typically composed by long lasting clients.  Potential clients were selected based on 
their dimension and market share within the textile industry. This aligned with the 
company´s strategy and production capacity, guaranteed Fisipe´s ability to fulfil its 
commitments. Over the years, a client´s “solid and loyal database” was established, 
built on a constant and transparent communication. 
3.4 Agents 
The company was also committed to establish a trusty relationship with its agents 
who, in addition to its own market managers and technical assistants, were “the eyes 
and ears of Fisipe in the world”.  
Fisipe had a local agent per country or in some cases per region and it established an 
exclusivity contract with them. The agent’s commission was on average 1.5% to 2.5% 
of the price. At least twice a year, the market manager met with the local agent to visit 
clients. This practice together with informal meetings not only had helped to establish 
confidence with potential clients but also allowed for a face to face knowledge over 
the years. The agents were contracted according to its know-how on the market, on 
specific clients and their identification with Fisipe´s business values: “ethics; innovation 
as a factor of progress; professional qualification and human development; social and 
environmental responsibility”.  
4. The American Opportunity 
Prior to 2004 there was a number of acrylic fibre producers supplying the US and 
Canada markets. Sterling and Solutia had manufacturing plants in the US, whilst 
Acordis and AKSA exported fibre from Europe to America. Kaltex supplied these 
markets in limited quantities from Mexico. In 1998 Sterling stopped producing, leaving 
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Acordis, AKSA and Solutia. The latest had the largest market share, due to its 
advantage as a domestic player. However, in 2004 Solutia decided to close its acrylic 
fibre plant due to declining margins, and new environmental guidelines that were 
imposing great costs to upgrade its power generation facilities. The American market 
was left with no local AF producer and, therefore, a supply shortage of commodities 
and coloured fibre.  
During 2005, Acordis was struggling with financial problems and running at low rates. 
It started by reducing its number of spinning lines for textile acrylic opposing to an 
increase on lines for carbon fibre and special fibres. Acordis, who had been the 
number one supplier for the hand knitting yarn market, was expected to cease its 
acrylic unit by the end of the year.  
Fisipe was studying the American market in face of such events. The company realised 
that there was demand for three different sectors: the machine knitting fibre sector – 
with a raw white commodity product, the hand knitting fibre sector – with a gel dyed 
product (coloured fibre) and the outdoor fabrics fibre sector – with a pigmented dyed 
coloured product for outdoor application.  
The last two sectors were very attractive in terms of margins, presenting a higher 
market value. However, Fisipe only had technology to supply the commodity fibre 
(machine knitting sector - AKSA and Kaltex were already supplying it) and the gel dyed 
fibre (hand knitting sector – AKSA was already supplying it). In the latest sector, Fisipe 
enjoyed a modern technology and a good colour fibre quality10.    
AKSA, Montefibre and Kaltex were the potential threats to Fisipe regarding these two 
sectors. AKSA the worldwide leader had competitive prices due to its cost efficiency, a 
good quality and a wide colour catalogue. In addition, it was growing in Maghreb and 
entering the Egyptian and Middle East markets. However, Fisipe believed that AKSA 
had a poor CRM policy. Montefibre also displayed a very complete colour portfolio and 
a respected reputation in Italy, Spain and Maghreb. It was investing a lot in softness 
and colour fibre quality, but in Fisipe´s opinion its aggressive negotiation strategy was 
                                                          
10
 Fisipe possessed a modern gel dyed technology, a wide colour portfolio and it was good at replicated 
colour, meaning that it managed to reach the same colour standards over productions.    
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its major drawback. Kaltex aimed for a greater supply role in the market, but it 
struggled with continuous quality and service problems.  
4.1 Coats and Clark  
The American textile culture was known as practical but conservative, in terms of 
taking risks with new suppliers. The contracts were typically agreed in a long term 
perspective in order to avoid variation on the final product. The quantities supplied 
and delivery times were agreed beforehand leaving the price with some margin for 
negotiation, due to raw materials´ price volatility. Textile producers were commonly 
supplied by more than one fibre manufacturer.  
Coats and Clark was the largest American producer of hand knitting / craft yarn, whose 
major suppliers were Solutia, AKSA and Acordis. Fisipe Barcelona tried to supply this 
major client with gel dyed fibre in the past. However Coats and Clark standards for a 
good supplier were not present in Barcelona. Barcelona lack of commitment, support 
to its agent and clients and additionally its delays on deliveries created a bad 
reputation for the company on the American market.  
As Tiago Gonçalves stated over Coats and Clark: 
“We needed to gain their trust. Barcelona was a bad experience with bad agents. Yet 
we were facing a great opportunity in the craft yarn market.” 
4.2 Jeff Dellinger - Agent  
In early 2005, Fisipe made the first contacts with Jeff Dellinger inviting him to visit 
Fisipe´s plant. Jeff had worked for Sterling, Acordis (as North American Market 
Manager) and Solutia (as Director of Sales). He knew these producers and the North 
American market very well, where he kept a long relationship with its customers. Jeff 
helped to close the Solutia plant and then went to work for Foss Manufacturing 
Polyester Company as Sales Director.  
As Jeff stated: “I was basically finished with acrylic. Having already been part of three 
acrylic companies, which two had closed, I was really not interested in getting back. I 
was employed at Foss, and certainly not interested in leaving that job to become a 
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commissioned acrylic fibre sales agent. I especially was afraid of Fisipe, since their 
earlier efforts with their previous agents had been such a disaster”.  
José Miguel Contreiras knew that for Fisipe to successfully re-enter the North 
American market, it needed someone who knew the market and had the customers´ 
trust. Jeff was the perfect candidate.  
In March 2005, Jeff flew to Lisbon for a weekend to see the plant and to discuss on 
what Fisipe was doing to become a “world-class fibre producer” as Jeff stated. 
According to José Miguel Contreiras the main objectives of the visit were: 
 “Jeff Dellinger to know Fisipe, plant and product portfolio. 
 Fisipe to know the North American market potential for Fisipe’s products. 
 To discuss an “Agent Contract” terms with Jeff.” 
After the traditional tour on Fisipe´s plant, Jeff commented the following: 
 “Fisipe is very similar to Solutia plant but better maintained. 
 Solutia is a 50 year old plant. 
 Equipments are in a poor condition compared to Fisipe. 
 Some equipments in Solutia’s Cutting and Balling area are more recent and 
in good condition. 
 Solutia already received the visit of AKSA, Montefibre and the Mexicans of 
Kaltex in order to analyse any buying potential” 
Fisipe proposed to Jeff the possibility to become its agent and to keep his job in Foss 
Manufacturing, at the same time. Fisipe would advance him commissions to get 
started and Tiago would give him all the support. By the end of the weekend, Jeff was 
convinced to give it a try. He returned to the US as Fisipe´s agent. 
However, Jeff was aware that Fisipe´s reputation was damaged by its first attempt to 
enter the market through Fisipe Barcelona. He considered that the Spanish were not 
responsive and were difficult to work with. In addition their agents were not well 
respected in the US market. 
According to Jeff the fibre price was not the key issue for the North American 
customers. Instead, he knew that what was essential to make business in the US was: 
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 Communication – keep the customer informed; 
 Honesty – Do not try to hide mistakes, preferably try to solve it together 
with the clients; 
 Service – Have a flexible, creative, responsive and quick service; 
 Quality – The North American clients wanted products that would run 
efficiently with no problems. This allowed them to keep a low labour force 
and compete with China.  
4.3 The kick off meeting 
Tiago recalled what Audie Mcdearis, Coats and Clark Manufacturing Director, said on 
the first meeting at Georgia: “I am only receiving you because of Jeff.” 
Audie´s relationship with Jeff, together with his concern on Acordis situation, 
motivated Coats and Clark to give Fisipe a second chance. By the summer of 2005, Jeff 
started receiving calls from other clients worried about not having enough stock by the 
start of the hand knitting yarn season. They were interested in Fisipe as a potential 
substitute to AKSA and Acordis.   
Flying home in a 9 hour TAP flight Newark – Lisbon, Tiago Gonçalves and José Miguel 
Contreiras were wondering about the opportunity with Coats and Clark. Both were 
discussing Jeff´s recommendation regarding Fisipe to become member of the craft 
yarn council11 and the possibility to rent a local warehouse near the Coats and Clark 







                                                          
11
 A clients, producers and suppliers association responsible for streamlining the Hand knitting yarn 




Exhibit 1 – Fisipe´s picture and data in 2004 
 
Location Lavradio (Portugal) 
Area 20 Hectares 
Nº of employees 270 
Activity Acrylic fibre 
Production capacity 60.000 ton/year 
Business Volume 78.000.000 €/year 
Exports 98% of total sales 










Exhibit 2 – Simplification of Fisipe´s supply chain 
 







Source: Adapted from Fisipe supply chain diagram on Fisipe documents. 
 
Exhibit 3 - Acrylic Fibre Demand  
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Capacity in 2004 
(ton/year) 















Acordis England Grimbsy (England) 90.000 
Kaltex Mexico Altamira (Mexico) 70.000 
Fisipe Portugal Lavradio (Portugal) 60.000 
Dolan Germany Kelheim (Germany) 15.000 







Exhibit 5 - Fisipe sales evolution in value (2005-2012 forecasts)  
Note: EEC (European Economic Community)  
Source: Data from Fisipe documents. 
 
Exhibit 6 - Fisipe Group in 2000 
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Note: Fisipe Hungary capacity was not included in the total Fisipe capacity since its 
production was dependent on Fisipe´s Lavradio and Barcelona plants. 
Source: Commercial department data in 2000 
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Exhibit 7 - Acrylic, Polyester and Cotton Price trend 
 
Source: Acrylic Fibre market scenario and Future development by Montefibre. 
 
Exhibit 8 - Demand Growth of Polyester and Acrylic 1980-2004 
 
Source: PCI in Reviving Acrylic Demand – a look at antipilling fibre by Thai acrylic Fibre 





Exhibit 9 - Acrylonitrile – Offer/Demand in 000 tons 
     Real   Forecast   
Source: PCI, Asahi Mitsubishi 2005. 
 
 
Exhibit 10 - Acrylonitrile Growth Forecast 2004-2005 
 






1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 average/year
End - Uses
Acrylic Fibre 2327 2531 2450 2563 2479 2509 2490 2600 2680 2746 2796 2862 1,2%
ABS/SAN 1000 1283 1227 1332 1444 1528 1585 1623 1708 1818 1932 2000 4,5%
Adiponitrile 443 463 412 378 374 371 361 361 357 354 361 361 -2,5%
Copolymers NB 137 187 190 199 208 222 229 238 232 236 260 266 3,6%
Other 256 379 409 402 411 422 432 441 421 445 476 490 2,6%
Total Consumption 4163 4843 4688 4874 4916 5052 5097 5263 5398 5599 5825 5979 2,1%
Production 4629 5471 5782 5417 5921 6006 5944 5944 5964 5994 5994 6004 0,9%





Exhibit 11 - Variation of Global Acrylic Fibre Capacity in recent years 
Source: Review on Acrylic Fibre market in 2005 and perspective on market for 2006 
from China chemical Fibre Economic Information Network (CCFEI) 
 
Exhibit 12 - Industrial Consumption of Acrylic Fibre    
 
Real             Forecast 
Source: PCI of 2005 
1990 1995 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2010/2005
North America 195 158 161 128 120 80 70 59 -8,10%
Latin America 162 128 179 146 157 154 156 157 0,00%
Western Europe 451 349 310 260 175 127 118 104 -6,43%
Eastern Europe 262 154 118 130 138 150 156 170 2,81%
Turkey 130 191 214 267 295 305 315 327 1,74%
Af.Mid.East 102 167 267 276 273 277 289 300 1,76%
Australasia 5 7 8 2 2 1 1 1 0,00%
South Asia 155 240 309 278 221 200 180 157 -5,83%
India 52 86 111 114 111 120 133 141 3,98%
China 324 653 794 985 1120 1338 1467 1600 4,74%
S.Korea 199 75 34 47 35 24 18 17 -8,15%
Taiwan 118 92 56 42 33 28 23 19 -8,73%
Japan 186 113 86 36 28 27 27 25 -2,24%
Total 2341 2413 2647 2711 2708 2831 2953 3077 1,93%
Capacity 2766 2939 3099 3167 3026 3098 3140 3250 0,83%
Ut. Rate 84,6% 82,1% 85,4% 85,6% 89,5% 91,4% 94,0% 94,7%




Exhibit 13 - Acrylic Fibre – Demand Growth 1980-2004 
 
Source: PCI in Reviving Acrylic Demand – a look at antipilling fibre by Thai acrylic Fibre 















1980-2005 0.92% per year 




Exhibit 14 - AF Capacity loss 2000 to 2005 
 
Total of -906 kt 
 
AF capacity Added since 2000 
 
Total of +650 kt 









Exhibit 15 - Acrylic fibre Surplus Deficit by Countries 
 
Source: Acrylic Fibre market scenario and Future development by Montefibre. 
 
Exhibit 16 - Fisipe sales - Evolution 
Ton 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 (until June) 
Commodities 46494 44045 48720 48993 22373 
Specialities 3546 2711 3752 5949 4224 
Total 50040 46756 52472 54942 26597 






Source: Fisipe Strategic Plan 2005-2010 
Ton JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN 
Commodities 3003 3525 4634 3879 3847 3485 
Specialities 400 476 813 661 901 973 
% Specialities 12% 12% 15% 15% 19% 22% 
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Exhibit 17 - Fisipe´s Organizational Chart in 2005 
Source: Fisipe document´s  
 
 
Exhibit 18 - Fisipe Total Clients in 2005 
 
Note: GM = gross margin 






45 clients 57 clients 209 clients
1ºParamount – 9% of GM 
2ºTradevcogen – 7% of GM 
3º Munditextil – 7% of GM 
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The present Literature Review focus on strategic and managerial subjects specifically 
related to the main themes of the case. Thus more general and widely known 
literature on competitive strategy was left out of this review. 
1. B2B Relationships and relationship marketing  
Business-to-business relationships offer opportunities to establish competitive 
advantages and achieve superior results (Jap, 1999; Panayides, 2002; Ulaga, 2003 
quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010).  
According to Hutt & Speh (2004) cited in Cater & Cater (2010) B2B marketing 
essentially consists in building long-term relationships with customers, by establishing 
and maintaining high levels of customer loyalty (Berry & Parasuman, 1991 cited in 
Cater & Cater, 2010), which can lead to higher levels of profitability (Reichheld and 
Sasser, 1990; Jones and Sasser, 1995; Reichheld,1996 cited in Rauyruen & Miller, 
2007). In this sense, the concept of Relationship Marketing has gaining power in the 
industry sector as source of competitive advantage and has its foundation on the 
commitment-trust theory developed by Morgan and Hunt (1994) quoted in Pillai & 
Sharma (2003). 
In the academic field the term relationship marketing and CRM (Customer Relationship 
Management) are often used interchangeably (Parvitiyar and Sheth 2001 quoted in 
Payne & Frow, 2006). “CRM relates to strategy, managing the dual - value creation, the 
intelligent use of data and technology, the acquisition of customer knowledge and the 
diffusion of this knowledge to the appropriate stakeholders, the development of 
appropriate (long-term) relationships with specific customers and/or customer groups, 
and the integration of processes across the many areas of the firm and across the 
network of firms that collaborate to generate customer value" (Boulding et al.,2005 
quoted in Payne & Frow, 2006) 
When there is an intensity of competition, many suppliers shift from a differentiation 
strategy focus on the product itself (Ulaga, 2003 cited in Cater & Cater, 2010) to focus 
on the business relationships (Cater & Cater, 2010). Additionally, it has also been 
evident a shift from a transaction-based to a relationship-based marketing perspective, 
over the years (Pillai & Sharma, 2003). As companies become relational-oriented they 
must engage with relational norms and relational behaviours (Pillai & Sharma, 2003), 
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and focus on building trust and establish commitment with customers through 
information exchange systems (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001 quoted in 
Pillai & Sharma, 2003). Nevertheless it is expected that both - trust and a relational 
culture – to progress over the stages of a buyer-seller relationship (Pillai & Sharma, 
2003). 
2. Relationship quality 
The concept of relationship quality has been explored in the relationship marketing 
field, by authors like Crosby et al. (1990) and Dwyer et al. (1987) cited in Rauyruen & 
Miller (2007) and, although there are different definitions of this concept, there is 
agreement in considering it as an higher order construct (Lages et al., 2005; Bejou et 
al., 1996; Crosby et al., 1990; Dorsch et al., 1998; Hennig-Thurau and Klee, 1997; 
Kumar et al., 1995; Storbacka et al., 1994;Walter et al., 2003;Wulf et al., 2001 quoted 
in Rauyruen & Miller, 2007) aiming to elevate indifferent customers to loyal ones 
(Berry and Parasuraman, 1991 cited in Rauyruen & Miller, 2007).  
Hence, Relationship quality has been linked with customer loyalty (Hennig-Thurau & 
Klee, 1997; Roberts, Varki, & Brodie, 2003 quoted in Liu, Guo, & Lee, 2010) through 
components such as: overall quality (Hennig-Thurau & Klee,1997), commitment 
(Hennig-Thurau & Klee, 1997), satisfaction (Crosby et al., 1990; Dwyer & Oh, 1987) and 
trust (Dwyer & Oh, 1987; Hennig-Thurau & Klee, 1997) (Liu, Guo, & Lee, 2011). 
Customers not only judge their relationships on their expectations, predictions, goals 
and desires but also on past experiences (Crosby, Evans & Cowles, 1990, cited in Liu, 
Guo, & Lee, 2010). 
Other authors (like Woo, 2004 and Ennew, 2005) believe on the quality of B2B 
relationships as a crucial element to succeed in the market (Rauyruen & Miller, 2007), 
since it affects how relationships evolve, its revenues, its costs and its profitability 
(Holmlund, 2008 cited in Cater & Cater, 2010). 
3. Relationship quality components 
According to Rauyruen & Miller (2007) relationship quality can be divided in an 
interpersonal level (relationship quality with the employees) and in an interfirm level 
(relationship with the supplier as a whole). In addition these authors propose that 
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customer loyalty (behavioural and attitudinal loyalty) is influenced by relationship 
quality through the following dimensions: trust, commitment, satisfaction and 
perceived service quality. 
Research by Athanasopoulou (2009), Holmlund (2008) and Woo and Ennew (2004) 
propose a different set of relationship quality components as adaptation, knowledge 
transfer, trust and cooperation (Cater & Cater, 2010). Being the first two linked with a 
technical dimension (Cater & Cater, 2010) whereas the last two are associated with a 
social dimension (Holmlund, 2008 quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010). 
The first technical dimension – adaptation - stands for the modifications made by one 
firm (Brennan & Turnbull, 1998:31, cited in Cater & Cater, 2010) to meet particular 
needs of another firm (Cannon and Perreault, 1999:443, cited in Cater & Cater, 2010). 
This concept includes both the investments needed to close a transaction and the 
ajustments made over time (Hakansson, 1982 quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010). Through 
adaptation value is created for both firms. On one hand, who adapts is creating entry 
barriers for competitive suppliers (Hallén et al, 1991, quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010) 
and it is influencing its partner to stay in the relationship through a normative 
commitment - moral obligation (Cater & Cater, 2010). On the other hand value is 
created for the other firm (Cannon & Perreault, 1999; Powers & Reagan, 2007; Wilson, 
1995 quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010) who sees products and processes being adapted 
towards its capabilities (Cater & Cater, 2010). 
Other authors even consider switching barriers as affecting customer loyalty. While 
satisfaction and trust can be considered as pull-in forces, which influence customers to 
stay within a relationship on the long term, switching barriers, as tangible and 
intangible costs of switching, act as a push-back force and focus more on the short 
term relationships (Liu, Guo, & Lee, 2011). Nevertheless it is believed that product 
quality is an indispensable customer value element and it contributes to higher levels 
of customer loyalty in any B2B relationship (Cater & Cater, 2010). However product 
quality is only an entry condition (Ulaga, 2003, quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010) to start 
a relationship, that can be elevated to a level where both sides benefit beyond the 
simple transaction of goods (Ford, 1980, quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010).  
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All in all suppliers need to invest in both relationship quality dimensions and 
product/service quality dimensions (Rauyruen & Miller, 2007), as independent 
variables (Cater & Cater, 2010). 
4. Commitment, loyalty and trust 
Commitment and trust are central factors that contribute to successful relationship 
marketing because they lead to cooperative behaviours and produce outcomes that 
promote efficiency, productivity and effectiveness (Morgan & Hunt, 1994 quoted in 
Cater & Cater, 2010). 
However the appropriateness of commitment as relationship quality dimension in b2b 
context frameworks is not consensual (Athanasopoulou, 2006; Boles, Johnson & 
Barksdale, 2000 cited in Cater & Cater, 2010). Instead there are findings telling that 
commitment acts as a mediator between relationship quality and customer loyalty 
(Cater & Cater, 2010). 
Customer loyalty can be divided into behavioural loyalty and attitudinal loyalty 
(Rauyruen & Miller, 2007). The first, according to Chaudhuri and Holbrook´s (2001) 
quoted in Rauyruen & Miller (2007), relates to the intention to repurchase and 
therefore, to maintain a business relationship. The second, attitudinal loyalty regards 
the psychological attachments from the customer with respect to the supplier 
(Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001, quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010). For instance, positive 
word of mouth and disposition to recommend the product or service to others are 
seen as attitudinal loyalty behaviours (Zeithalm et al., 1996 quoted in Rauyruen & 
Miller, 2007).  
Commitment can be broken in calculative commitment (positive and negative), 
affective commitment and normative commitment (Ruyter & Semeijn, 2002; Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, Scheer, & Kumar, 1996; Kumar, Hibbard, & Stern, 1994; Sharma, Young, & 
Wilkinson, 2006 quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010) 
Calculative commitment represents a rational (Gilliand & Bello 2002:25 cited in Cater & 
Cater, 2010) or instrumental reasoning ( Geyskens et al.,1996, and Kumar et al., 1994, 
quoted in Cater & Cater, 2010) of attachment to the supplier. The nature of the 
attachment can be positive or negative (Sharma et al., 2006 cited in Cater & Cater, 
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2010), for instance if a firm do not change supplier because does not have an 
alternative, we face a negative / locked – in commitment (Cater & Cater, 2010). 
On the other hand, if the commitment derives from the set of benefits inherent to the 
relationship, it is named positive calculative commitment (or value–based 
commitment). It is believed that trust contributes to a positive calculative 
commitment. (Cater & Cater, 2010) 
The affective commitment relates to emotional, social (Gilliland &Bello, 2002: 25, 
quoted in Cater & Cater 2010) and friendship feelings (Sharma et al., 2006:65,69 
quoted in Cater & Cater 2010). Several authors believe that affective commitment is 
also positively influenced by the levels of trust (de Ruyter & Semeijn, 2002; de Ruyter 
et al.,2001; Geyskens et al., 1996; Gounaris, 2005; Wetzels et al., 1998 quoted in Cater 
& Cater, 2010) and cooperation (Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001, quoted in Cater & Cater, 
2010) on the business partner. 
Nevertheless trust or commitment for the employees and not for the supplier, as an 
organization, finds no support to its contribution to gain loyalty among the customers. 
Therefore, B2B Managers ought to invest in brand image and its credibility as an 
organization. (Rauyruen & Miller, 2007) 
At last, normative commitment as the name says comes from moral and obligation 
factors (Bansal et al. ,2004, and Kumar et al., 1994 quoted in Cater& Cater 2010).  
Both affective and normative commitment are more emotional componets and more 
dependent on social dimensions like trust and cooperation (Cater & Cater, 2010). 
Studies on B2B manufacturing relationships evidence the importance of the 
emotional/social side as reason to stay in the relationship over the rational/technical 
factors, such as knowledge tranfer or adaptation. Thus long term relationships based 
on trust are pointed out to create an affective and positive calculative commitment 
which leads to either behavioral and attitudinal loyalty. (Cater & Cater, 2010)  
5. Customer value anticipation 
Suppliers not only must know what customers value, they also need to anticipate what 
those customers will value (Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 2011). In this sense it is important to 
react (Cannon & Homburg 2001 quoted in Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 2011) but also to 
develop the expertise in anticipating emerging needs (Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 2011). Such 
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ability in suppliers relationships is defined as customer value anticipation which 
positively affects customer satisfaction and customer loyalty (Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 
2011). Customer value anticipation is gainning importance simultaneously with the 
changing role of the industrial agent (Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 2011), namely from a 
persuasive skilled to a managerial skilled agent (Weitz & Bradford, 1999; Wotruba, 
1996 quoted in Flint, Blocker, & Jr., 2011). To firms that are focusing too much on the 
present and on keeping its customers only satisfied, customer value anticipation can 
be advantageous over competitors, by having a forward-looking vision likely to 
anticipate what will be the next market opportunities and customer demands (Flint, 
Blocker, & Jr., 2011). 
6. Commodity products 
Commodity products are seen as non-differentiated industrial products perceived by 
the suppliers as homogeneous products (Unger, 1983; Rangan and Bowman, 1992; 
Sinclair and Seward, 1988 quoted in Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002) that are 
functionally identical to those of the competition and its production satisfy basic needs 
with standard or fixed specifications (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002).  
According to Unger (1983) quoted in Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson (2002), 
undifferentiated materials or products are produced in similar forms by different 
suppliers and are used in a number of different applications, having typically low-to-     
-average profitability. On the other hand, the same author conceptualizes 
differentiated materials (or products) as differing according to suppliers, or marketed 
differently, with fewer applications and sold according to specifications on how they 
perform, having therefore above-average profitability.  
The figure below shows different commodity categories, that according to Unger 
(1983) quoted in Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson (2002) can also be used in industries 














Figure 1 – Categories of products  
Source: (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002) 
7. Commoditization process  
According to some authors all products and services reach a commodity status at a 
certain point, and business organizations are in fact, confronted with a 
commoditization phenomenon (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008).  













Figure 2 - Commoditization: drivers and effects 
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Commoditization occurs when a company with a competitive advantage in the market 
faces standardization, higher customer experience by increasing market offerings and 
successful imitation by rivals. All these market forces create difficulties in keeping the 
firm differentiation and deteriorate the firm financial position through profit 
squeezing. (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008) 
In a commodity steel industry study of Albert (2003), quoted in Matthyssens & 
Vandenbempt (2008), a customized service pack for building differentiation is 
proposed. Similarly for the commodity chemical industry, Robinson, Clarke-Hill and 
Clarkson (2002), quoted in Matthyssens & Vandenbempt (2008), propose a 
“servitization” approach as a way of fighting the commoditization phenomena.   
Finally also in studies developed on business markets in general, this logic of 
transitioning from products to solutions (by adding services) in order to recapture 
competitive differentiation is much recommended (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 
2008), as product and price are less differentiating factors nowadays (Ulaga and 
Eggert, 2006 quoted in Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008).  
In fact, literature suggests for companies dealing with commoditization, to shift from 
basic-product offerings to service-based ones (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008). 
As Gebauer and Friedli (2005) stated, “competing through services enables product 
manufacturers to earn higher margins” (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008).  
However it is not easy to develop a service-value approach in traditionally 
commoditized companies. Its success will depend on the extent that companies 
integrate the “new” rules into its operations (Auguste, Harman and Pandit, 2006 
quoted in Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008) and consider service support and 
personal interaction as fundamental (Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008). 
But how can a company build a competitive differentiation and implement a de-
commoditization strategy? 
Having in mind Porter (1980, 1985); Barney (2002); Buzzell & Gale (1987); Mintzberg 
(1988); Treacy & Wiersema (1995) cited in Matthyssens & Vandenbempt (2008) there 
are three value propositions that lead to competitive differentiation:  
 Product leadership proposition – differentiation based on product innovation 
and superior product qualities; 
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 Customer linking proposition - differentiation based on service innovation and 
customer bonding; 
 Cost leadership proposition - based on operational excellence and price-based 
offers. 
For companies that do not pursuit a cost efficiency strategy and do not compete 
through a price base strategy, the third value proposition is not recommended. On the 
contrary a de-commoditization strategy based on ‘non-price’ value offering is 
proposed, namely product leadership or customer linking propositions. However this 
does not mean that increasing manufacturing efficiency is not beneficial, yet it creates 
a short term and temporary advantage. 
To succeed in adding customer value it is necessary to develop ground-breaking 
initiatives, a proactivity and customer-centred attitude and cooperation logic with 
partners in the supply chain.  All the potential supplier value creation efforts demand a 
close bond with customers but also with customers´ customers. 
All in all a de-commoditization process which consists in evolving from a basic product 
offer to a service and augmented solution implies a value creating network view and 
involves a cultural change within the company and supply chain. 
(Matthyssens & Vandenbempt, 2008) 
8. Servitisation 
According to Levitt (1972) quoted in Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, (2002) “there 
are no such thing as service industries, there are only industries whose service 
components are greater or less than those of other industries. Everybody is in service.” 
In industrial markets service is associated with after sales interventions, mainly due to 
some problems that might have occurred with the product itself (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, 
& Clarkson, 2002). Nevertheless, a different managerial mind-set emerged as the term 
Servitisation has broken through with Vandermerwe and Rada (1988) work (Robinson, 
Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002). Servitisation considers the total customer offer as an 
integrated bundle of both goods and services, thus it goes beyond the augmented 
product concept and additional services traditional approaches (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, 
& Clarkson, 2002).  
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Quinn et al. (1990) believe that management must break with the traditional reasoning 
that considers manufacturing (or goods production) as separate from the service 
activities (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002).  
In fact in the typical industrial product offering, service is something additional while in 
the servitised mind-set, the core product and the service are linked, as figure 3 shows 
(Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002). 
 
Figure 3 - Servitised and Non-Servitised systems 
Source: (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002) 
9. Service as a differentiating factor 
Service and relationship management strategies´ are used to escape from the 
commodity trap (price dominated) and be able to build competitive advantages in 
commodity-type industries (Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002). Literature, in the 
commodity sector of the chemical industry (Wei et al., 1979; Emerson, 1983; 
Stobaugh, 1988; Quintella, 1993; Black, 1994) shows that industrial marketing is based 
mainly on price and production efficiency as companies´ core activity (Robinson, 
Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002). 
In a study developed with respect to marketing in the commodity chemical industry, 
conclusions on the key service attributes and its importance were found as listed 
below: 
“1. Regular contact with customers 
  2. Order handling procedures 
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  3. Emergency response to accident and prevention 
  4. Technical information 
  5. Delivery on time 
  6. Credit terms 
  7. Technical service and assistance 
  8. JIT delivery procedures” 
(Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002) 
If commodity industries want to differentiate themselves and avoid cost leadership 
strategies, a possible strategy is augmenting product attributes through service. 
Service is in fact recognised as a valuable and differentiator factor in the commodity 
industries and as a way to overcome price as the only determinant factor. 
All in all it is possible to truly overcome the challenge of applying service marketing in 
non-differentiated markets, as some commodity chemical companies have already put 
in practice a servitisized system, by reducing the distance between parties and building 
close relationships. The concept of relationship marketing is closely linked with the 
existence of a regular contact with customers, not being possible to establish a strong 
supplier-customer relationship without it. 
(Robinson, Clarke-Hill, & Clarkson, 2002) 
10. Strategy focus on the product vs focus on the relationship 
As companies augment their product offerings with services, and the value proposition 
changes from product-centric to customer-centric, they are expected to face 
considerable challenges (Kindström, 2010).  
According to Neely (2008) quoted in Kindström (2010) these challenges, faced by 
product-based companies in their “servitization” process, are the following: 
“challenges of shifting mind-sets, challenges of timescale (related to a longer time 
horizon) and challenges of business models/customer offerings (related to an 
increased focus on value-in-use)”. 
Managers in many industries are confronted with the erosion of the traditional 
product based business model (Malleret, 2006 quoted in Kindström, 2010). For many 
companies, including manufacturing, placing a higher orientation in business service 
may be a growth area (Jacob and Ulaga, 2008 cited in Kindström, 2010). 
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Product-based companies, that want to increase their service orientation and to 
address it in a more focused manner, should consider the inclusion of services that 
meet changing customer needs (Kindström, 2010) since services demand higher 
integration and coordination with customers (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003 quoted in 
Kindström, 2010). 
In such context, companies need to approach change in all areas of their business 
model and not only in isolated elements. To change the value proposition and to make 
further alignments - both internal and external – are necessary to create and capture 
new value. The traditional focus of change has been in product development and 
production operations, yet as the service content increases, the focus shifts to other 
business model parameters as the following framework suggests.  
 
Figure 4 Service based business models: key elements  
Source: (Kindström, 2010)  
All in all managers who are determined in investing in new service development (NSD) 
or in service innovation must consider: first, to develop the company’s ability to 
promote and explain the service value propositions, which require different 
promotional techniques; second, to develop relationship building competences (more 
proactivity and ability to capture customer needs for instance) in all organization parts; 
third, to understand customers´ processes and even customer´s customer activity, 
fourth, to design a dynamic portfolio that changes according to customer needs; fifth 
to establish service delivery infrastructures, either with internal or external resources; 
and sixth, to develop new revenue mechanisms based on customer profitability. 
47 
 
Nevertheless managers must keep in mind that establish good relationships with all 
customers is costly and challenging, therefore it can be beneficial to segment the 
customers portfolio in order to develop services accordingly to each segment. 
(Kindström, 2010) 
11. Organizational culture  
According to Edgar Schein quoted in Hampden-Turner (1992), corporate culture is a 
pattern of assumptions that are considered valid as the correct way to deal with 
problems that derive from external adaptation and internal integration. Schein argues 
that culture operates at three levels: basic assumptions, values and artifacts / 












Figure 5 - Schein´s three levels of culture 
Source: (Schein, 2004) 
This model can be used by companies as a way to identify and change corporate 
culture by taking into consideration all cultural aspects (Hampden-Turner, 1992). 
Companies must be aware that having a fit between strategy and organizational 
culture is required if any change or improvement in the present culture will be made 
(Muratovic, 2013). 
If an organization is able to maintain a strong and desired culture, it is likely to enjoy 
higher levels of performance, a person-organization fit, job satisfaction and 
competitive advantages (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). On the other hand, when 
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organization members identify with the culture, the work environment tends to be 
more enjoyable (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011) increasing the levels of teamwork, 
information sharing and openness to new ideas (Goffee, Jones 1996 quoted in Demir, 
Unnu, & Erturk, 2011).  
 But how to change or improve the corporate culture, since it is known to be hard to 
change it successfully? (Bresnen, Marshall, 2000 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 
2011) 
The first step is to diagnose the actual and the desired culture (Muratovic, 2013). An 
helpful tool is the "Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument" – OCAI, developed 
by Cameron and Quinn (1999), which is used worldwide to identify the preferred and 
perceived culture profiles based on core values, assumptions, interpretations, and 
approaches that characterize organizations (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). This 
instrument is developed over the theoretical model - “Competing values framework” - 
developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011).  
The Competing values framework (fig. 6) presented below proposes a four type culture 










Figure 6 - The Competing Values Framework  
Source: (Cameron & Quinn, 1999) 
The four typologies vary along two dimensions of organizational effectiveness (Quinn, 
1988 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). The first dimension distinguishes to what 
extent the company favours flexibility, discretion, and dynamism over stability, order, 
and control. The second dimension discriminates between to what extent the 
company emphasises internal focus, integration and unity over external focus, 
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differentiation and rivalry. (Cameron and Quinn, 1999 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & 
Erturk, 2011) 
The quadrant in which scores are the highest indicates the type of culture most 
present in the organization whose success depends on the ability to companies match 
its culture with the competitive environment (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). 
The Clan culture (Collaborate) 
The Clan culture emphasises internal maintenance with flexibility, concern for people 
and for customers; thus it has a focus on human relations and has flexible operational 
procedures (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). Leaders in this type of organizations are 
mentors and loyalty is very present (Igo and Skitme, 2006 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & 
Erturk, 2011). At last, Clan-type firms value teamwork, employee involvement 
programs and corporate commitment to employees (Cameron, Quinn 1999 quoted in 
Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). An example is the modern industrial organization where 
a strong sense of community is present (Ouchi and Jaeger, 1978; Ouchi and Johnson, 
1978 and Ouchi, 1980 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). 
The Adhocracy culture (Create) 
Adhocracy culture concentrates on external positioning/focus and in a high degree of 
flexibility and individuality. There is a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative 
environment where a risk taking attitude is promoted, by visionary and innovative 
leaders. (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011)  
An organization with adhocracy culture values creativity, experimentation, risk 
autonomy, individual initiative and emphasises long-term growth (Igo, Skitmore, 2006 
and Cameron, Quinn, 1999 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). 
The Hierarchy culture (Control) 
The Hierarchy culture focuses on internal maintenance, stability and control, where 
there are clear tasks setting and strict rules. The leader’s role is usually to coordinate 
and organize. (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011)  
At last, in this culture there is a focus on economy, standardized rules and operations, 
control mechanisms, formality, rationality and obedience (Igo, Skitmore, 2006 and 
Cameron, Quinn, 1999 quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). Banks, insurance firms, 
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government agencies and utilities have characteristics of the hierarchical profile (Deal 
and Kennedy quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). 
The Market culture (Compete) 
The Market culture is characterized by being result-oriented with clear and rational 
goals that are achieved by high productivity and economical operations (Demir, Unnu, 
& Erturk, 2011). Competitiveness, perfectionism and aggressiveness are valued (Demir, 
Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). Moreover, the leaders play a tough and demanding role 
(Cameron and Quinn, 1999, quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). Attention should 
be paid to the term Market here, which represents an emphasis on the transactions 
with external players, such as suppliers and customers, (Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 2011). 
This type of organizations values winning, competitive pricing and market leadership 
(Igo, Skitmore 2006 and Cameron, Quinn 1999, quoted in Demir, Unnu, & Erturk, 
2011). 
The OCAI tool is especially useful for a manager to uncover key culture aspects that are 
not easily identifiable. The OCAI questionnaire is divided in six clusters: Dominant 
cultural characteristics, Organisational Leadership, Management of Employees, 
Organisational Glue, Strategic Emphasis and Criteria for Success. After assessing the 
OCAI questionnaire it is possible to draw an overall culture profile, dependent on the 
quadrant of the competing values framework got the highest score. 
(Cameron & Quinn, 1999) 
In order to diagnose and change its culture, a firm should engage in a dialogue process 
by a selected group, potentially including different organizational level´s (Muratovic, 
2013). The optimal group can have ten to fifty people and the selection should 
represent a cross-section of the organization (Schein, 2004 quoted in Muratovic, 
2013). These members should individually answer the OCAI questionnaire and later 
discuss the results among them (Muratovic, 2013). After reaching a consensus, the 
current and the desired culture profile can again be recorded into the tool, in order to 
compare both, using graphical representations and data provided by the OCAI 
instrument (Muratovic, 2013). This can help managers to know where to act and in 




Cameron and Quinn (1999), propose the following six steps action plan for initiating a 
cultural change within an organization: first, “reach consensus on the current culture”; 
second, “reach consensus on the desired future culture”; third, “determine what the 
changes will and will not mean”; fourth, “identify illustrative stories”; fifth, “develop a 
strategic action plan”; sixth, “develop an implementation plan”.  
Nevertheless, it is dangerous to believe that culture can be evaluated in an absolute 
way and to suggest the existence of a “right” organizational culture; hence a “good”, 
“bad” or “functionally effective” culture depends on its fit with the existing 
environment (Schein, 2004). 
12. Reputation 
Reputation has been conceptualized as the representation of a company´s past actions 
and future expectations on the firm key values when compared to its rivals by the 
stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996, p. 72 quoted in Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). Corporate 
reputation is also identified as an intangible asset (Keh & Xie, 2009) of considerable 
interest that contributes to competitive advantage of organizations in the long run 
(Dowling, 2004; Rose and Thomsen, 2004; Fombrun, 1996, quoted in Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2004). Besides, reputation is represented as the firm´s cumulative judgements 
over time (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990, p. 235 quoted in Brammer & Pavelin, 2004) 
and over the different relationship stages - from strangers to acquaintances to friends 
and to partners (Johnson & Selnes, 2004 quoted in Keh & Xie, 2009). 
A reputation-based relationship is more evident in the beginning followed by a trust-    
-based and, at last, a commitment-based relationship, where there is the willingness to 
pay a premium price (Keh & Xie, 2009). In this sense, in the initial stages of a 
relationship (with no previous transaction between both parties evolved) a good 
reputation can be synonym of the seller's competence (Campbell, 1999, quoted in Keh 
& Xie, 2009). 
Corporate reputation management is crucial for companies (Dowling, 2004; Rose and 
Thomsen, 2004; Fombrun,1996, quoted in Brammer & Pavelin, 2004), specially to 
those relationship-oriented  (Keh & Xie, 2009), since there is evidence of a positive 
relationship among corporate reputation, financial performance (e.g., Podolny, 1993; 
Fombrun, 1996; Roberts & Dowling, 1997, 2002 quoted in Keh & Xie, 2009) and 
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customer identification (Keh & Xie, 2009). The reputation of a firm works as a mirror to 
communicate information on the product and service quality to target groups, in 
comparison to its competitors (Yoon et al., 1993, quoted in Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001).  
A good reputation takes a long time to build, and it is a long term process within the 
organization, but it can just take a few moments to be dismantled (Keh & Xie, 2009).   
A favourable reputation can be created if the company repeatedly succeeds in fulfilling 
its promises. On the contrary, if a company fails to respect its expressed intentions 
that leads to a negative reputation (Herbig and Milewicz, 1993, quoted in Nguyen & 
Leblanc, 2001). 
Nevertheless, there are divergent opinions regarding how reputation is built or 
destroyed but, literature has focused on the role of social responsiveness as 
influencing stakeholder´s perceptions of organizations and it is argued that social 
responsiveness positively influences the relationships between firms and primary 
stakeholder groups (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). 
Good relationships with stakeholders enable the creation of valuable intagible assets 
for firms (Hillman and Keim, 2001, quoted in Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). Findings 
suggest that in order to build a good reputation, firms should focus on CSR (Corporate 
Social Responsibility) activities, regarding employment, environment, community, 
supply chain management among other dimensions, but in accordance to the firm´s 
size and the firm´s business activity principles (Brammer & Pavelin, 2004). 
In a B2B context, it is also important to mention the concept of customer identification 
(Keh & Xie, 2009). Customer identification and customer trust are positively influenced 
by corporate reputation (Keh & Xie, 2009) and a stronger customer–company 
relationship emerges with customer´s identity with the company (Bhattacharya and 
Sen, 2003 quoted in Keh & Xie, 2009). 
13. Corporate image 
The higher the perception of a favourable corporate image and reputation the higher 
is the retention likelihood. A better understanding of both distinctive concepts - 
corporate image and corporate reputation - can help firms to communicate their 
position and strategy more effectively. (Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001) 
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Corporate image is the impression made on the minds of the public about an 
organization (Barich and Kotler, 1991; Dichter, 1985; Finn, 1961; Kotler, 1982 quoted in 
Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001). A company projects more than one image to its stakeholders 
which makes important the attempt of harmonizing the firm activities´ and to be 
aware of the emotional and functional attributes of the corporate image components 
(Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001). Corporate image is a result of a process (MacInnis and Price, 
1987 quoted in Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001) that is formed by ideas, feelings, and previous 
experiences later transformed into mental images (Yuille and Catchpole, 1977 quoted 
in Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001). Even if a consumer has not yet experienced any type of 
contact with a firm, some perceptions can be developed from other sources of 
information like advertising or word-of-mouth (Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001). 
In corporate communication, marketing managers should emphasize and coordinate 
elements of corporate reputation to create a favourable image and higher customer 
loyalty levels (Nguyen & Leblanc, 2001). 
14. Managing reputation  
All corporations or institutions have two assets on which success and survival are 
based. Firstly, its Brand - upper case ‘B’– that represents the image, reputation, 
financial assets, performance and people; and secondly, its brand – lowercase ‘b’– 
meaning the products or services sold or provided. 
(Cravens, Oliver, & Ramamoort, 2003)   
One should not take precedence over the other, and efforts should be allocated on 
both (Harris, 1998, p. 22 quoted in Cravens, Oliver, & Ramamoort, 2003). 
Associated with high reputation, corporations enjoy a set of advantages according to 
Fomburn (1995) quoted in Cravens, Oliver, & Ramamoort (2003) such as: their 
products and stock offerings capture more customers and investors – and command 
higher prices; their jobs attract more applicants – and generate more loyalty and 
productivity from the employees; the influence on suppliers is greater – and they pay 
lower prices for purchases and have more stable revenues, their risks of crisis are 
fewer – and when crises occur, the financial loss is smaller. The concepts of corporate 
reputation and image represent vital strategic resources. The model illustrated below 
presents a framework for managing the process through which both critical assets 
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(corporate image and corporate reputation) are created and preserved. Basically, the 
company’s identity is translated into an image in the eyes of its several stakeholders 
through several communication mechanisms and channels. It is the management’s 
responsibility to be in charge of the company’s identity and communication system, as 
a way to develop and maintain a recognizable image and a favourable reputation. 
(Gray & Balmer, 1998) 
 
Figure 7 - Operational model for managing corporate reputation and image.  
Source: (Gray & Balmer, 1998) 
This model illustrates the fundamental components of the process, namely corporate 
identity, communication, image and reputation. Besides, it traces the 
interrelationships amongst these components and highlights the importance of 
feedback to the efficacy of the process. Competitive advantage is considered the 
output of the process. However this outcome can be affected by exogenous factors. 
Companies manage these components with two main objectives in mind: to create the 
intended image and a favourable reputation in the stakeholders´ minds, which require 
an exemplary identity that can only be formed through consistent performance, 
usually over the years. A strategic advantage can be obtained if importance is given to 
corporate identity, image and reputation from senior management levels. 
(Gray & Balmer, 1998) 
Cravens, Oliver, & Ramamoort (2003) proposed a Reputation Index (Appendix 1) based 
on specific measures relating to: products, employees, external relationships, 
innovation and value creation, financial strength and viability, strategy, culture, and 
intangible liabilities. The reputation index attempts to be a standardized set of 
common and unique measures that are consistent across companies and industries. 




After valuing from 1-9 each measure of the reputation index and after calculating for 
each component its average, an overall measure can be created by applying weights to 
each component. In this index there is a weights´ suggestion, however these weights 
may vary significantly in importance according to specific company characteristics. 
The last step to create a corporate reputation index is to have a classification ranking, 
which it will allow to classify the value obtained as corporate reputation level. 
(Cravens, Oliver, & Ramamoort, 2003) 
15. Generic competitive strategies 
According to Porter (1985) there are two basic types of competitive advantage, either 
a firm has low costs or presents a differentiating attribute. Thus Porter (1985) 
proposes three generic strategies that a firm chooses from as a way to compete within 
an industry. The Generic strategies framework is presented below. 
 
Figure 8 - Three Generic Strategies 
Source: (Porter, 1985) 
Cost leadership 
When a firm chooses to follow a cost leadership strategy it is engaging in a low-cost 
production and has to be the industry cost leader. Thus it presents a cost advantage 







When a firm chooses to a differentiation strategy it is choosing some attributes that 
make it unique when compared to the competition. But a differentiator is also 
concerned about costs and is looking for reducing them as long as it does not affect its 
differentiation assets.  
Focus 
The focus strategy consists of choosing a specific industry segment (target) to 
approach. The firm optimizes its strategy for that target in order to obtain a 
competitive advantage. A cost focus strategy exploits differences or particularities in 
buyers cost behaviour whereas differentiation focus seeks the target special needs. 
However Porter (1985) recognises that each strategy has inherent risks and presents a 
table with drawbacks for each strategy. 
RISK OF COST LEADERSHIP RISK OF DIFFERENTIATION RISK OF FOCUS 
 
Cost leadership is not 
sustained 
 
Differentiation is not 
sustained 
 






 Other bases for 
cost leadership 
erodes 
 Competitors imitate 
 Bases for 
differentiation 
becomes less 
important to buyers 
The target segment 
becomes structurally 
unattractive 





differentiation is lost 
  









   The advantages of 
a broad line 
increase 
 
Cost focusers achieve 




achieve even greater 
differentiation in segments 
 
New focusers sub-             
-segment the industry 
 
Figure 9 - Risks of the Generic Strategies  
Source: Adapted from Porter, 1985, page 21, table 1-1 Risks of the Generic Strategies 
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16. Industry life cycle 
Industries are in constant evolution affected by external forces like technology, 
demand and economic growth and internal factors like the competition and their 
strategies.  It is possible to detect some patterns, as a result of the external and 
internal forces, in industries allowing for a classification in the industry life cycle. 
Industries typically evolve over time across four stages: the introduction, growth, 
maturity and decline. Companies ought to be aware in which phase their industry is, in 
order to anticipate changes and successfully adapt to them. 
(Grant, 2006) 









Figure 10 - Industry life cycle 
Source: Adapted from Grant, 2006, page 373 figure 10.1 
Growth, demand and technology diffusion are considered as critical factors affecting 
the industry evolution over the four stages. 
At the introduction stage, often the sales and penetration rates are low because the 
product is new and there are still few customers. The new technology, the small 
production scale, and lack of experience establish high costs of production and low 
quality. The customers have high bargaining power and seek for innovation.  
 At the growth stage, there is an accelerated penetration rate and the product 
innovation and technology start to become standard which is translated in a price 
decrease. In this stage the consumption becomes mass market consumption and the 
number of entrants is high as it is in the previous stage. 
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At the maturity stage the industry is considered has becoming saturated. There is 
increasingly a demand of replacement where the customers substitute the old 
products for new ones and companies become more concerned with costs efficiency. 
The standardization during the growth and maturity stages contributes for 
homogeneous products unless the companies manage to differentiate in other 
dimensions such as complementary services. In this stage, industries go through some 
restructuring periods, in average after 29 years of existence, reducing to half of the 
producers (S. Kleeper and E.Grady, 1990 quoted in Grant, 2006). It is frequent to 
observe mergers and acquisitions and dropouts. Afterwards the number of entrants 
and exits stabilizes and the remaining are those that manage to survive. In the majority 
of the industries this stage is associated with an increase of concentration. 
The last stage - decline - is characterized by the appearance of substitute products 
developed in other sectors with superior technology. The excess of capacity and 
foreign competition is associated with an intense price competition. 
(Grant, 2006) 
17. Key factors in mature sectors 
The opportunities to obtain competitive advantages in mature sectors and profitability 
rates diminish due to the lower margin for differentiation, overall easy access to 
technology, stronger supplier’s power, international pressure (namely from countries 
with lower cost structures), product standardization and price competition. With the 
stage of maturity the competitive advantages depend more on cost efficiencies as a 
result of standardization. Therefore it is important that companies tight their overall 
costs, look for scale economies and inputs at low cost. This strategy is recommended 
for companies whose competitive advantage is based on costs, which is many times 
difficult to maintain in face of the international pressure typical in this stage.  
On the other hand, a success factor for companies in a mature industry is to segment 
and select clients, since the industry can present attractive market niches as profitable 
opportunities. Companies select the most attractive customers and transform the less 
valuable into more valuable clients. 
Since the profitability of the overall industry tends to be squeezed and the source of 
differentiation becomes limited it is recommended to move from a differentiation 
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based on the product features towards the image. Moreover as the product becomes 
less differentiated, there is an increase investment on the complementary services as a 
source of differentiation. As the innovation on the product and process starts 
diminishing over the time, the strategic innovation gains relevance. (Grant, 2006) 
Finally as companies in mature sectors are studied it is believed that: 
 Each company has potential to rejuvenate; 
 Companies are affected by the context where they operate but it is possible to 
be creative and succeed; 
  When there is limitation on competitive advantages sources, strategic 
innovation gains a critical importance; 
 Organizations need to establish an entrepreneurial spirit willing to experiment, 
and learn when embraces strategic innovation;  
 Companies select where they want to compete; 
All in all, the success in mature industries is many times dependent on the capacity of 
companies to reach operational efficiency whilst keeping innovation and client´s 
responsiveness. Suitable organizational structure and management style are requested 
for the success. 












































Source: (Cameron & Quinn, 1999)  
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Fisipe – Fibras Sintéticas de Portugal was founded in 1973 by the Japanese firm 
Mitsubishi and the Portuguese group – CUF. In 2005 it supplied with acrylic fibre more 
than 300 clients spread in 35 countries. 
Over the years Fisipe managed to be respected as an international player which was 
proven with the acquisition of Fisipe Barcelona and Fisipe Hungary. As the acrylic 
industry started to give signs of maturity, the company was forced to close both 
factories leaving Fisipe in a difficult financial situation. 
R&D, innovation and anticipation to market opportunities was in the company´s DNA 
since the beginning. With the Barcelona closure, Fisipe invested in the gel dyed 
technology considered as a market opportunity for the future. In the meanwhile, a 
challenging strategic plan for 2005-2010 was designed which represented a 
fundamental turning point at all levels. Fisipe wanted to place a customer oriented 
culture over the traditional commodity mind-set.  
Worldwide many competitors were closing their acrylic plants leaving clients and 
segments undersupplied. In this context José Miguel Contreiras (COO) and Tiago 
Gonçalves (America and Africa Regional Sales Manager) targeted the American gel 
dyed market. Coats and Clark was the biggest client in this market and Fisipe was 
convinced that it had the technology and production capacity to become a Coats and 
Clark supplier. However Fisipe has gained a negative reputation with Fisipe Barcelona 
in the past. The lack of commitment and the delays in delivery time damaged Fisipe´s 
image and credibility. 
This time Fisipe was committed to find an agent who knew the US market and Coats 
and Clark. Jeff Dellinger – an ex senior manager of two major companies in the acrylic 
American market and trusted by Coats and Clark managers - accepted to be Fisipe´s 
American agent. Jeff managed to arrange a meeting with Coats and Clark 
manufacturing director – Audie Mcdearis – who showed low expectations regarding 
the success of the business. To Dellinger, Contreiras and Gonçalves it was time to plan 




This case presents strategic and managerial dilemmas of an international acrylic 
manufacturing company, in a B2B context. Thus, several themes can be discussed and 
used with a pedagogical objective in class. The main teaching and reflection points that 
can be raised in a strategic analysis are the following: 
The challenges faced by producers in the acrylic industry - a commodity type industry; 
 In a commodity type industry, like the case of the acrylic industry, 
manufacturing companies are traditionally focused on the product, and its 
performance. However margins decrease and price competition intensifies 
when products are similar. Producers, to avoid the commodity trap, should 
consider new differentiator factors and focus on the customer and 
augmented value propositions which can include service offerings. 
 The acrylic industry as a mature industry demands companies to find new 
sources of competitive advantage and to target the most attractive clients.  
The effective change of an organizational culture and its value proposition;  
 A strategic plan, whose vectors and actions are challenging for an 
organization, is effectively implemented if the organizational culture is in 
accordance to such propositions. 
The impact of a negative reputation and image as determinant factor for making 
business; 
 A bad reputation derived from bad experiences with the brand can 
influence the willingness of a supplier to give a second chance to the firm. 
To overcome such obstacles and restart a relationship it is advised that 
companies show flexibility, credibility and a consistent performance over 
time. Thus the likelihood of the company to gain the client´s trust and later 
retention increases.   
Moreover the case can also provide basis for further analysis in other strategic fields, 
not developed in depth in this dissertation, such as: 
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 Internationalization - an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages 
of Fisipe´s entry mode (exports through a local agent) can be debated. 
 Management of a cross cultural client’s portfolio – the analysis of the 
cultural diversity impact in the commercial department and the logistics 
needed to manage a client´s portfolio spread all over the world.  
 The Portuguese and American culture - similarities and disparities 
between the Portuguese and the American culture and whether the 
Portuguese culture is a benefit or a drawback to make business globally. 
 The increasing power of China in the textile and acrylic industry.  
All in all this case opens a wide range of managerial and business strategy themes 


















The following questions are suggested in order to help students prepare for the class 
discussion: 
I. How has Fisipe´s strategy evolved over the years?  
II. How is Fisipe responding to the acrylic industry pressures? 
III. How can Fisipe succeed regarding the American opportunity? 
Class plan 
1. Fisipe´s Strategy – (45 min to analyse the following questions)  
a) How do you characterize Fisipe´s strategy until 2005? 
b) What are the similarities and differences between the strategy so far 
adopted and the strategic plan for 2005 -2010?  
c) What are the risks and benefits of both strategies? 
d) To what extent do you believe that the measures designed within the 
strategic plan 2005-2010 are in accordance to Fisipe´s ambition to become 
a “reference in the speciality market”?  
e) What other measures could be implemented in order to effectively change 
the “predominant commodity culture”? 
2. Acrylic Industry – (30 min to analyse the following  questions) 
a) How attractive is the acrylic industry? 
b) In what stage of the industry life cycle can the acrylic industry be placed, 
and what are the implications for Fisipe? 
c) How is Fisipe managing to survive in face of the acrylic industry pressures? 
3. American Opportunity – (35 min to analyse the following questions) 
a) How is Fisipe´s situation regarding its competitors´ position in the American 
market? 
b) Assuming that Coats and Clark after the first meeting decides on Fisipe to 
be one of its gel dyed suppliers how should Fisipe act in the short and 
medium-long term, to gain Coats and Clark trust and loyalty?  






a) How do you characterize Fisipe´s strategy until 2005? 
When Fisipe was under a custom´s protection in the Portuguese market one may argue 
that the company was practicing a (differentiation) focus strategy, as it was selling to a 
narrow target – the national market. After this period, as domestic leader, Fisipe starts 
to increase its presence internationally and therefore it is broadening its target. Hence 
the company from an initial phase practicing a focus strategy evolves to a 
differentiation strategy. Nevertheless, the company was across both periods 
concerned on cost rationalization and practicing competitive prices, as João Dotti 
(CEO) stated. 
On the other hand, it can be pointed out that AKSA follows a cost leadership strategy, 
which may justify its leadership position in the industry since a cost leader is the player 
with the lowest cost structure. Furthermore the possibility to practice low prices and 
experience economies of scale aligned with a substantial production capacity 
(according to the exhibit 4, AKSA in 2004 had 300.000 ton year capacity vs Fisipe 
60.000 ton year capacity) may also justify AKSA leadership position. 
Using the Porter Generic Strategies Framework, Fisipe can be placed in the Focus and 





(2º + 3º period) 
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The following table presents in more detail how Fisipe was strategically approaching 
the acrylic industry until 2005. 
 
Strategy 






























126.000 t/y Product division 
 
The first period ranges from the beginning of Fisipe´s activity until the company starts 
to export (around 1980). In this period Fisipe is a domestic company producing and 
selling standard fibre (raw white and raw black commodity) in Portugal. With a 
production of 12.500 ton/year it was still unnoticed in the acrylic industry.  
The second period ranges from 1980 until 2000, approximately. At this point, Fisipe is 
an international player, first exporting to neighbour countries and later to South 
Europe (Greece), Western and South Asia (Turkey and Pakistan) and Africa. The 
company continued investing in successive capital increases in order to keep its 
volume strategy (from 30.000 t/y to 60.000 t/y) in order to reinforce its international 
position. 
The third period ranges from 2000-2005, approximately. This period has Fisipe 
Barcelona and Fisipe Hungary acquisitions´ as milestones. Here it is evident an 
expansion strategy that consolidates Fisipe as the third largest European producer with 
126.000 t/y production. The company is no longer producing only one type of product 
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but it has invested in new technology to approach new markets, therefore indicating 
also a diversification strategy. The three plants (Lavradio, Barcelona and Hungary) 
complemented each other in terms of products and markets (Barcelona produced gel 
dyed fibre – coloured fibre, Fisipe Lavradio continued producing the commodity fibre 
and Hungary produced an open end fibre, as exhibit 6 shows). Fisipe was clearly 
investing in an internationalization strategy while it was decreasing its sales on the 
national market. 
Along these three periods it is evident a pattern on strategic vectors such as the 
volume strategy, a stock production and an orientation towards the product and its 
performance. Furthermore, the investment in R&D and innovation on the product has 
evolved gradually as major strategic concerns, especially in the second and third 
periods. 
b) What are the similarities and differences between the strategy so far adopted 
and the strategic plan for 2005 -201012?  
Until approximately 2000, Fisipe followed a strategy focused on the product and scale; 
the commodity product was at the basis of the company´s production and culture. The 
competitive quality, performance and price competitiveness were considered as the 
main differentiating attributes. The strategy designed for 2005-2010 meant a turning 
point to the company. At first, one can say that Fisipe is shifting from a strategic focus 
on the product to focus on the customers and markets. Hence the company is evolving 
from the traditional product-centric attitude to a customer-centric strategy, where the 
success of customer-supplier relationships determines the company´s success. In 
addition the speciality fibres - with greater market value and higher need for 
customization – are established at the core of the company´s activity as Fisipe aims for 
an international reference position in the speciality acrylic market. Thus it is possible to 
infer that the % of specialities sales (over the total sales) will continue to increase after 
2005 (taking into consideration exhibit 16). Moreover the production system is no 
longer to stock but predetermined for a specific customer. In this manner the 
company´s processes need to be flexible and creative, demanding a close interaction 
                                                          
12
 Note: This question addresses Fisipe Lavradio strategy, since in 2004 and 2005 Fisipe had already 
closed the other two plants. In the further analysis, the name Fisipe concerns to Fisipe Lavradio which 
represents now the entire corporation.  
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with its clients promoted by a constant communication between customers and the 
firm departments´. 
On the other hand, one can argue that a “servitisation” mind-set has arisen being 
materialized with Fisipe´s new value proposition. In fact the company proposes an 
integrated offer combining the product itself (fibre supply), a service during the 
transaction and a technical assistance. Such proposition is supported by Fisipe´s 
position as close to the client and the face to face contact kept over the years with 
clients. 
To sum up Fisipe has gradually adopted a customer centric strategy over a product 
centric one, but it has maintained the operational efficiency and productivity as 
constant concerns. Moreover the decision in keeping a diversified clients portfolio has 
also remained as a strategy, together with the constant innovation effort and R&D 
investments. 
c) What are the risks and benefits of both strategies? 
Starting with the differentiation strategy, as Fisipe´s generic strategy to compete in the 
Acrylic industry, one can argue that the differentiator factors that a company present 
as unique proposition and sources of competitive advantage can be imitated by 
competitors at a certain point; as consequence companies are challenged to update 
their differentiator attributes and be proactive in establishing new ones. Additionally, 
and even if competitors do not imitate, markets as dynamic forces might value other 
characteristics and undervalue the ones established by the firm at a certain point. This 
risk can represent a threat for firms that only react and do not anticipate what 
customer´s will value in the future; therefore companies that enjoy customer value 
anticipation ability might overwhelm the competition and benefit from customer 
satisfaction and customer loyalty.   
On the other hand, when shifting from producing only a commodity product to starting 
producing a coloured / speciality fibre it meant a change on the strategic focus and 
organizational culture. In the framework presented below it is possible to classify 




Even if not all the characteristics listed are true for Fisipe´s fibre we may position the 
commodity / standard fibre in the axis between a true commodity and a pseudo 
commodity, since the standard fibre meets the commodity conceptualization as a 
homogeneous product that functions identically to those of the competition, with 
relative low margins and widely used by many customers for different applications. But 
in Fisipe´s case it is also true that this fibre has to comply with accepted performance 
specifications, justifying the classification of this product (commodity/standard fibre) 
between the true commodity and the pseudo commodity categorization.  
On the other hand, the coloured / speciality fibre can be classified as a speciality 
product since it matches the characteristic of being designed to solve customers’ 
specifications, as reflection of being a more customized product. In addition the 
coloured / speciality fibre represents higher margins as consequence of higher market 
value.  
Fisipe diversified its portfolio by introducing a coloured fibre to escape somehow to 






(decision making) factor and costs as the determinant component. Nevertheless we 
have to notice that Fisipe is still competing in a commodity type industry, where 
products are homogeneous being harder to differentiate only through product 
performance. 
To overcome this challenge Fisipe developed the new offering proposition where it 
included two service dimensions (service during the transaction and technical 
assistance after the transaction). Nevertheless a “servitization” process can be risky if 
companies are not able to shift its mind-set towards the service dimension of the 
business model; in other words if the organizational culture sticks to the past and it is 
not able to become a “servitised” culture. 
With regard to Fisipe´s strategy in keeping a diversified clients portfolio (where no 
client accounts more than 10% of gross margin, in order to spread a commercial risk), 
this can post logistic implications and questions can be asked to the company´s ability 
in reaching the wanted position as the “supplier that has more proximity to the client”. 
In this sense it can be difficult for Fisipe to effectively change the strategic focus and 
differentiator factors from the product (quality and performance) towards the 
customer. One might foresee that the success of the strategy for 2005-2010 is much 
dependent on Fisipe´s ability to manage customer relationships, without losing 
product quality and its success in implementing a “servitised” culture.  
d) To what extent do you believe that the measures designed within the strategic 
plan 2005-2010 are in accordance to Fisipe´s ambition to become a “reference 
in the speciality market”?  
As mentioned in the case, the measures that Fisipe designed within the strategic plan 
were the following: first, a “staff renewal” policy in order to “recruit younger 
employees with higher formal educational levels”; second, the equipment 
modernization and adaptation towards a speciality fibre production; third, investments 
in R&D in order to develop new products and keep innovating in the existing 
processes; fourth, the simplification on the communication systems with clients and 
across departments; fifth, development of training actions for employees; sixth, 
partnerships with universities and clients in order to cooperate in the creation of new 
speciality fibres and to develop Fisipe´s technical fibre know how; seventh, the 
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integration of service elements in the traditional product offering, establishing 
therefore a “servitised” system. 
The diagram presented (horizontally) facilitates the following analysis on the measures 
appropriateness for Fisipe positioning “as the supplier that has more proximity to the 
client” and ambition to establish a “servitised” system.  
It is clear that the company invested in both relationship quality dimensions and 
product quality dimensions. These are independent but critical variables for a company 
to build solid B2B relationships with its customers, which in some cases leads directly 
to higher levels of loyalty or through commitment mediation, as mentioned in the 
academic review.  
The improvements on the communication systems can facilitate the company´s ability 
to cooperate with customers and better adapt to their demands through a greater 
bilateral knowledge exchange. Hence cooperation, knowledge transfer and adaptation, 
as relationship quality dimensions, materialize indeed a strategy focus on the 
customer. 
As the case does not specify on the nature of the internal training actions, one can 
propose that some of the training could be oriented to develop relationship 
competences and a “servitised” culture in all areas of the organization. For instance, 
training on new promotional techniques for the commercial and sales department to 
effectively communicate the new value proposition could be developed. As another 
example, explanatory sessions on customer´s activity and fibre specifications could 
lead to higher production adaptation and consequently customer satisfaction. Thus 
training is crucial to gradually disrupt with the commodity culture and gradually 
establish a “servitised mind-set”, but it must be developed at all organizational levels 
and in an integrated/coordinated way.  
The new offer/value proposition, if consistent and effectively implemented, can 
increase trust, satisfaction and perceived service quality. Moreover the technical 
assistance service can, for instance, discourage customers to switch suppliers and keep 
choosing Fisipe over competitors. 
Regarding the strategy to develop partnerships with clients this would positively 
develop the relationship between the two firms since there is a higher cooperation, 
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trust, adaptation and potential satisfaction for the customer. The partnerships with 
universities would allow Fisipe to try new products and develop a dynamic portfolio 
that can change according to customer’s demands. Besides, Fisipe would be able to 
better anticipate the future demands of the partner since it gained knowledge on its 
activity.  
The recruitment of younger and higher qualified employees is not directly related with 
relationship quality or product quality dimensions, but if those employees were 
proactive (a needed relational skill) such attitude can be spread, contributing to break 
with the commodity culture. 
With respect to the R&D investments towards the speciality and technical fibres 
together with the modernization of the equipment, both will influence product quality 
which is an indispensable customer value element. Therefore Fisipe could focus on 
establishing relationship dimensions in order to achieve its strategic goals and 
proximity to the client. A superior product quality is also proposed for firms choosing 
differentiation strategies as a competitive differentiation factor. 
All in all, Fisipe´s seven measures have potential to establish both relationship quality 
and product quality which can influence customer´s loyalty and commitment. Fisipe is 
indeed building on a relational-based strategy over a transaction-based strategy; 
through shifting from basic product offerings to service based ones. Thus Fisipe if 
committed to implementing such actions is engaging in a de-commoditization process 
through the incorporation of a “servitised” culture.    
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e) What other measures could be implemented in order to effectively change the 
“predominant commodity culture”? 
As referred in the literature review there is no such thing as the right culture. 
Therefore the ability to match Fisipe´s culture with the competitive environment 
where the company operates is indeed what is going to determine Fisipe´s culture 
effectiveness and success. Fisipe should be aware that its culture is not only expressed 
and translated in what is visible (for instance behaviours) and what is established and 
well known (like the values and procedures) but it is also present in basic assumptions 
that are taken for granted and therefore difficult to perceive. Fisipe should consider 
the three levels of culture and gradually move from establishing the desired culture, 
starting with visible aspects and after with deeper ones´. Thus, Fisipe could for 
instance improve norms and internal procedures while top levels were committed on 
giving the example and expressing the new culture in their attitudes, decisions and 
way to approach the client. Other concern that Fisipe should bear in mind is the level 
that the current culture is shared among members and how deeply it is. This is 
important in order to plan the whole process of changing, because it enables Fisipe to 
decide which type of activities should be developed and to whom be addressed. If 
potentially there is more than one culture different approaches to different groups 
might be requested in order to end up with a common culture. For instance the 
commodity culture might be more evident in departments with higher percentage of 
elder people than those that incorporated new staff.  
Having considered all of the above, Fisipe could develop an action plan following the 
six steps recommended by Cameron, which, in my view, can be summarized in two 
main steps, first “to reach consensus” (on the current and desired culture) and after to 
determine what changes will be set. The use of OCAI questionnaire could help the 
company on both steps; the questionnaire would help to discuss results on both 
profiles and later to decide on the actions. For this process and to get realistic results, 
a group composed by 2 people from each of the 5 different departments could be 
selected, since it is a small company. 
The help of a consultancy firm in this process could also be considered if Fisipe 
diagnosis is, in fact, in the presence of a culture that is creating strong obstacles to 
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reach a company-environment fit.  The advisory service could help Fisipe in developing 
internal training and for instance to redefine a reward system dependent on different 
variables, such as client satisfaction, more related with a “servitised” system and 
culture. 
2. 
a) How attractive is the acrylic industry? 
To assess the acrylic industry attractiveness and profitability one can use the five 
forces model of Porter. Although in the case there is not information regarding all the 
aspects that characterize each of the forces, a brief analysis on this subject can still be 
made. 
 Threat of new entrants 
In the AF industry it is required to have a considerable amount of capital to acquire 
equipment and set up a factory to produce fibre. Moreover, it is expected to live up to 
high legal requirements in terms of pollution and workers and installations security 
procedures, since it is within the chemical industry and uses acrylonitrile as raw 
material. The likelihood of the ones already established in the industry to enjoy 
economies of scale is high since there is a great dependency in gaining scale and 
production capacity to be able to compete within the industry.  
Therefore we can consider that the threat of new entrants is not significant. 
 Bargaining power of suppliers 
The acrylic producer’s suppliers are mainly acrylonitrile suppliers which are highly 
dependent on external prices such as oil prices, therefore the suppliers can easily drive 
up prices justifying it with the oil prices volatility. Moreover acrylic producers are 
extremely dependent on this input to produce any fibre which undermines their power 
to negotiate prices. Nevertheless since acrylonitrile is a true commodity, producers can 
easily switch suppliers and not be detected in their products. 
All in all suppliers force is considered to be significant. 
 Threat of substitutes  
Polyester as a direct substitute of acrylic fibre has had historically lower prices than 
acrylic fibre. Natural fibres, such as cotton, have prices similar to acrylic prices. 
Therefore it can be considered a moderated force threatening acrylic producers.  
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 Bargaining power of buyers  
As a commodity acrylic fibre is by nature a homogenous product and significant 
differences are difficult to perceive, buyers, in the textile industry, typically can switch 
among acrylic producers without engaging in relevant costs. Moreover buyers can 
choose over many players in the industry which leverage its power to negotiate prices 
over producers. For non-commodity fibres the handicap for acrylic producers is 
reduced. 
Therefore bargaining power of buyers is considered significant to moderate. 
 Industry rivalry: 
There are a high number of acrylic producers/competitors who are already established 
over many years in the industry. The exit barriers are significant since it is required a 
great investment to establish all the manufacturing processes therefore leaving the 
market entails high costs. Acrylic fibre is typically a commodity product which leads to 
price becoming the main decision factor and therefore being difficult to differentiate. 
Therefore the industry competition is considered significant. 
All in all, three out of five forces are considered significant (being one of them 
significant to moderate); hence we may say that the acrylic industry has little 
attractiveness or profitability for those who are considering to enter. 
b) In what stage of the industry life cycle can the acrylic industry be placed, 
and what are the implications for Fisipe? 
The acrylic industry shows signs of saturation and therefore it can be placed in the 







In the following analyses it will be listed some industry facts and what are its 
implications to Fisipe. 
It was registered a decreasing AF demand in Western Europe, since 2000, and only in 
Eastern Europe, Turkey, Africa, Middle East, India and China an AF consumption 
growth (of 0.6% a year, on average) is forecasted, for the period 2005-2010 in PCI 
reports. China and India are expected to be the most attractive regions with 0.9% and 
0.8% growth/year. Whereas in regions like North America, Western Europe, South 
Asia, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan a decreasing consumption around 1% a year is 
forecasted on average.  
Implications for Fisipe 
Fisipe can look for niche opportunities in the regions that are declining (North America, 
Western Europe) in supplying speciality fibres, which are more customized and 
modern.  At the same time the company could start supplying or intensify its presence 
in regions like China, India, Iran and Indonesia either because they are growing or 
presenting AF shortage and therefore importing from other regions. 
 
Acrylic fibre is becoming less attractive when compared to its substitutes, cotton and 
polyester. The last one is typically cheaper than acrylic, and its demand keeps 
increasing since 1980 (exhibit 8). On the other hand, AN total consumption is 
forecasted to increase on average for the period 2005-2010 around 3.5% a year, but its 
consumption by AF (one of the end uses of AN) presents a decrease on average of 
0.3% a year, for the period 2000-2005 and it is forecasted to increase consumption on 
2% on average for the following 5 years (exhibit 9).  
Implications for Fisipe  
Fisipe uses AN as raw material to produce its fibre, accounting for 70%-80% of the total 
production cost. The price of AN is much dependent on external factors namely the oil 
price, thus Fisipe has little control in obtaining inputs at low cost or in negotiating AN 




AN consumption by AF producers is expected to increase around 2% a year which can 
be justified mainly with China and similar regions growth and increasing capacity, 
which indicates that competitors from the other regions are disinvesting in the acrylic 
fibre production, leaving Fisipe within a more concentrated industry. 
Implications for Fisipe  
Fisipe is being pressured in two fronts, on one hand its gross margin is much 
dependent on price, and the majority of its production cost depends on external 
factors. On the other hand, in order to survive in a mature sector Fisipe must consider 
to tighten its costs. However this can only be achieved in reducing fixed costs. At last, 
the international pressure from traditional low cost regions, pushes Fisipe to invest on 
its image, complementary services and R&D to keep innovating, hence it is avoiding a 
competition on prices and moving away from the commodity product.  
 
Many producers closed their acrylic plants and exited the acrylic industry, in many 
cases to invest in the carbon fibre production. This milestone represents a 
restructuring period commonly seen in a mature sector after 29 years of existence (if 
we consider the closure of Fisipe Barcelona and Solutia in 2004 it accounts for 29 years 
since the beginning of Fisipe´s activity in 1975). There was a worldwide capacity loss of 
256 kt in 2005 (exhibit 14) leaving countries like China, Iran, Indonesia and USA with an 
AF deficit.   
Implications for Fisipe  
Fisipe can analyse the opportunities brought from the closures of big players, such as 
Sterling, Solutia and Acordis, and select undersupplied clients as profitable 
opportunities. Fisipe has the opportunity to decide where to compete and also with 
which products. Many times what is not attractive to some companies it is so, for 





c) How is Fisipe managing to survive in face of the acrylic industry pressures? 
Fisipe is establishing a new culture focused on the customer and supported by 
flexibility and operational efficiency. In this sense Fisipe is being proactive and 
innovating strategically in order to survive in face of industry maturity.  
Moreover through its partnerships and R&D investments to cooperate for new fibres 
and develop latest technology the company is increasing the clients switching costs 
and it is extracting more value out of its portfolio, avoiding its customers to choose 
mainly on price and shift to competitors with lower cost structures.  
Fisipe keeps its portfolio diversified and spread worldwide not to be much dependent 
on few customers or in particular regions, thus it is surviving to the demand 
contraction on some regions. The company, according to exhibit 19, is already selling 
to undersupplied regions like China and Iran, but it could even study the possibility to 
enter India and Indonesia.  
Fisipe is demonstrating to be attentive to market moves, for instance when Fisipe 
Barcelona closed, Fisipe Lavradio started previously to invest in gel dyed technology as 
anticipation to the plant closure and future market preferences. Also in face of a 
restructuring period in the industry, the company was doing market research looking 
for opportunities left in the US, for instance. Fisipe is being able to look outside its 
walls and adapt to market preferences (speciality fibre and development on technical 
know-how) whilst changing internally in order to establish a flexible organizational 
structure and a new image (through training actions, staff renewal policy, 
modernization of equipment, constant communication and integrated service 
offering). 
3. 
a) How is Fisipe´s situation regarding its competitors´ position in the American 
market? 
In order to analyse Fisipe and its competitors regarding the US market, it is helpful to 
list what are the pros and cons for Fisipe, Montefibre, AKSA and Kaltex. These aspects 
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Fisipe hired Jeff Dellinger to become its agent in the US market. Jeff had worked for 
Sterling, Acordis and Solutia so he knew very well the acrylic American market; his 
knowledge on what is valued by the American clients (communication, honesty, 
service, quality) and how competitors performed constitutes one of Fisipe´s strengths; 
which can be used to overcome the negative reputation left by Fisipe Barcelona and 
Fisipe´s unfamiliarity with the US market. Furthermore Jeff´s presence could give 
confidence to clients to start doing business with Fisipe and step aside the American 
conservative culture. At least this could be achieved together with ex-Sterling, ex-         
-Acordis and ex-Solutia clients and assuming that they have a good impression of Jeff.  
According to Jeff, Fisipe´s plant, when compared to Solutia, is better maintained and 
newer, which can impact Fisipe´s ability to produce a good quality fibre and meeting 
American client´s expectations.  
Fisipe´s new strategy supported by better communication channels, augmented offer 
(product and service), flexible logistics and focus on customers is in line with some of 
the key factors to enter the US market pointed by Jeff, namely keep customers 
informed and have a flexible service.  
In 2004, Fisipe started to develop gel dyed technology in Lavradio as anticipation to 
Barcelona closure. Therefore, and in comparison to Montefibre, Kaltex and AKSA, 
Fisipe presents a more updated technology which can have consequences in producing 
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Montefibre can benefit in the American market from its reputation and credibility in 
Spain, Italy and Maghreb, because as referred in the literature review, even if a 
consumer has not experienced any type of contact with a firm, some perceptions can 
be developed from other sources of information like advertising or word-of-mouth. 
Therefore if Montefibre communicates its image and reputation as strategic resources 
to enter the US market, it might succeed. 
This player invests in softness and fibre quality; it presents a wide coloured fibre 
portfolio which can allow the company to target a wide range of customers or to 
supply one customer with different colours.  
However Montefibre should consider its negotiation strategy when approaching new 
markets, as the conservative US market, because an aggressive attitude can convey a 
negative first impression and fail to close some deals especially with clients that are 
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The Mexican company Kaltex (together with AKSA) already supplies the machine 
knitting fibre sector, which can constitute an advantage since the company is already 
familiar with some clients and therefore it can manage to intensify its position in other 
sectors. We may say that the risk aversion culture, in the US, can actually post an 
opportunity for Kaltex. On the other hand, being located in Mexico allows for quicker 
delivery times and lower shipping costs which can post an advantage when compared 
to players based further. 
However Kaltex may face some barriers in growing within the US market if it does not 
manage to overcome its quality and service problems, considering that in order to 










The Turkish worldwide leader – AKSA – has a competitive cost structure allowing the 
practice of attractive prices. AKSA has high production capacity (300.000 t/y) and it 
supplies already the US machine knitting sector, with a commodity fibre. Therefore 
AKSA might benefit from greater brand equity on the US market. Furthermore, and as 
consequence of its leading position, it might symbolize a strong brand and a trusty 
supplier leading to potential clients to choose AKSA over other companies as a 
consequence of its worldwide leadership. 
According to Fisipe´s opinion, AKSA presents a faulty CRM policy which might be 
connected with its strategy based on competitive prices and low production costs 











mentioned as a key factor for making business according to Jeff, which might limit 
AKSA´s ability to expand to non-commodity sectors (for instance the hand knitting 
sector – speciality fibre) whose clients value other attributes beyond price. 
After assessing each company pros and cons in the US context one can conclude that 
having a quality product and a wide colour catalogue might be a requisite of the 
industry since it is possessed by more than one player (Fisipe, Montefibre and AKSA). 
We may foresee that Fisipe is in a good starting point to enter the US market with Jeff 
as North America agent and displaying a modern technology and equipment. 
Nevertheless we do not have information regarding competitor’s agents which limits 
our conclusions in this matter. Finally, Fisipe might consider approaching the US 
market cautiously regarding its negative reputation left by Fisipe Barcelona and taking 
into consideration the unfamiliarity with such conservative culture. It is possible that 
Fisipe might need to gain client´s trust at first, by being transparent and not dismissing 
the need to fulfil client’s requirements in terms of quality and service.  
b) Assuming that Coats and Clark after the first meeting decides on Fisipe to be 
one of its gel dyed suppliers how should Fisipe act in the short and medium-      
-long term, to gain Coats and Clark trust and loyalty? 
In the Short term 
 Fisipe internally could delegate in the sales department someone to focus on Coats 
and Clark and be responsible to manage effectively this client. 
 Product quality - the assurance of providing quality gel dyed fibre should be the 
primary concern of Fisipe. The company should try to meet all the specifications 
imposed by Coats and Clark and be consistent over time regarding product 
performance. Succeeding on that, Fisipe is developing reasons for Coats and Clark 
to repurchase and therefore stay within this relationship (behavioural loyalty), 
through a positive calculative commitment also named as value-based 
commitment.   
 Flexibility – Fisipe should rent the local warehouse near the Coats and Clark factory 
to prevent it to run out of stock especially assuring enough stock for the start of 
the hand knitting yarn season. This decision would prove Fisipe´s commitment and 
long term vision towards this client. At the same time it enhances the firm capacity 
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to adapt and being flexible, which once again would lead Coats and Clark to stay in 
the relationship (behavioural loyalty). 
 Credibility – Fisipe needs to meet (and be consistent overtime) with what was 
agreed on the contract that typically regards quantities and delivery times. Acting 
in this way Fisipe is avoiding to fall into Barcelona errors and establishing a credible 
and trusty image.   
 Visit Fisipe´s plant - Fisipe could propose for Coats and Clark to visit Fisipe´s plant, 
like Jeff did before his acceptance to be Fisipe´s agent. Upon the visit Fisipe would 
be able to communicate its values in order to establish a sense of identification 
with Coats and Clark. Moreover Fisipe would be able to show the factory, 
promoting its modern equipment and technology. At the end, the company could 
also guide the visit to the quality control, technical assistance and R&D 
departments, in order to Coats and Clark meets Fisipe´s employees who eventually 
would work with them. Such visit, together with informal dinners would potentially 
establish an affective commitment between both firms and a relationship quality 
with the “supplier as a whole” (at an interfirm level) avoiding the development of 
trust or commitment only for the employees and not for the organization.  
In the Medium-long term 
 Social components - Keep always an eye on the emotional side and not focus only 
in the rational side, meaning that although a transaction based relationship 
between both firms is expected in the beginning, later on Fisipe should focus more 
on building a relational based relationship, as it is expected to occur over the time. 
In order to do so Fisipe should focus on the emotional/social components such as 
cooperation. Thus the company could propose a Partnership to Coats and Clark 
where both firms would cooperate in developing and sharing knowledge on new 
colours, alternative fibre applications and textile trends. 
 CRM - Fisipe should focus in relationship quality dimensions to elevate Coats and 
Clark to loyal customers, through the implementation of an integrated CRM system 
(CRM information technology system and CRM applications) across departments 
which would allow Fisipe to closely manage its relationships, not only with Coats 
and Clark but also with other clients.  For example Fisipe could invest in a software 
application where clients can trace its merchandise and also post questions to the 
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firm. Such investment, in order to be effective, presupposes CRM training across 
departments (especially to those who would daily use such tools) and a CRM 
culture across the organization. It would create value for both sides, since the 
clients could be better informed about its product and Fisipe would better adjust 
its production and procedures to meet Clients requirements. 
 If Fisipe would not have financial capacity to do such investment it could consider 
to visit more often the US market, especially Coats and Clark in the beginning of 
the relationship.  
Besides these actions regarding Fisipe and Coats and Clark relationship, other strategic 
decisions could also be considered by the company to gradually establish itself in the 
US market:    
 Craft Yarn Council - If the company becomes member of the Craft Yarn council it 
could establish a network with various stakeholders. Moreover the company would 
become familiar with the US market and customer trends, which could leverage its 
relationship with Coats and Clark, for instance. Besides it would be an opportunity 
to develop marketing initiatives in this market such as: attending fairs, 
conferences, among others. 
 US clients - Fisipe could check the possibility to supply other clients who contacted 
Jeff. My recommendation is that Fisipe should trade-off between focus in 
establishing a safe relationship with Coats and Clark whilst approaching other 
clients. If Fisipe succeeds in becoming supplier of Coats and Clark (the number one 
producer of kraft yarn) it is already creating brand equity within the US market 
which will certainly attract and reassure other clients. 
 Solutia plant - consider visiting Solutia, as the other players already did, for a 
potential acquisition of the plant, or just to check on Solutia´s Cutting and Balling 
area. 
c) How can Fisipe build a positive reputation in the American market? 
Fisipe, together with the investment in its product performance and service quality 
(the lower case “b”), should also consider its Brand (the upper case “B”), which 
represents the company image and reputation, among other crucial assets. 
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If Fisipe manages to develop a favourable reputation within the American market it 
would allow it to strengthen its existent relationship, with Coats and Clark for instance, 
and develop new ones. Moreover the link between the firm and other stakeholders 
could also become strengthened, since a favourable reputation attracts investors, job 
applicants, partnerships and financial gains.  
In order to overcome the unfavourable reputation left by Barcelona, Fisipe managers 
should engage in managing Fisipe´s corporate identity, corporate image and corporate 
reputation. It is crucial that management levels really engage in a process where 
corporate identity (meaning Fisipe´s DNA – strategy, decisions, values, attitudes) is 
consistently communicated through communication channels with the objective of 
creating an intended image and reputation in the stakeholder´s minds, which 
ultimately can create a competitive advantage. However in this process managers 
must be open to incorporate internal and external feedback and shape companies 
actions constantly. Moreover a consistent performance over the years is crucial to 
show credibility to strengthen the intended image within the markets. 
Fisipe´s managers could use the reputation index, as a tool to assess and classify the 
company reputation. First, the management level ought to engage one or two 
employees, across departments, to assess the index. This “committee” could be 
heterogeneous in terms of sex, profiles and position/status within the departments to 
better assess employees opinions and overall satisfaction regarding the company. All 
the agents involved in such activity should previously receive a training session in order 
to guarantee their understanding on why the company is developing such activity and 
how it will work. After the “committee” assess the reputation index and the reputation 
classification obtained, it can discuss how to build the company reputation and 
particularly identify critical component results, obtained on products, employees, 
external relationships, strategy, and culture, among others. Such information would 
allow top management to decide whether or not branding is critical to Fisipe and how 
to develop it. 
In my point of view, the company could look at the consistency of its corporate identity 
elements, and more important if these elements project the “new” - relationship 
oriented Fisipe. The company could modernise for instance its website, social media 
pages, logo, slogan, layouts of business documents, or even transform the office in 
90 
 
open spaces to leverage communication and a dynamic culture. This recommendation 
would not only contribute internally for employees to better embrace the new culture 
and feel motivated about it, but it would also communicate the firm’s strategy when 
agents or potential clients visit Fisipe´s offices. 
On the other hand, Fisipe can also judge its engagement with Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and whether such activities are important at Americans eyes. 
Solutia closed due to new environmental guidelines in the US, hence it can be a sign of 
the relevance of environmental issues and that potentially, companies concern with 
CSR activities are better off. Therefore, Fisipe might already benefit of its updated 
technology, probably more environmental friendly, but it should continuously be 
aware of its environmental impact, regarding for instance its pollution levels and 
controls.  
To sum up, for Fisipe to recover from a bad reputation within the US market it should 
assure consistency in its performance, develop the marketing of its “new” strategy 




















“The future has several names. For the weak, it is impossible; for the fainthearted, it is 
unknown; but for the valiant, it is ideal.” Victor Hugo 
After concluding my dissertation I am aware that nothing in business is black or white, 
there is always some grey area. In other words, managers many times see themselves 
in face of tough situations, where they need to dare, take risks and decided based in 
the available information. 
In this case, Fisipe decided to implement a new strategy which broke with some 
established procedures and with the organizational mind-set, in response to external 
pressures. Nevertheless, I believe that the company was able to find a medium term in 
this process, because it did not fully discontinue some policies, for instance the 
maximum of 10% GM per client, and it was still able to innovate and anticipate market 
trends.  
On the other hand, in a business context that is no longer profitable for big players 
there can be attractive opportunities for smaller ones´. Fisipe was able to target 
undersupplied markets and overcome the industry contraction. Therefore, in my 
understanding it is crucial to keep always an eye on the “outside”- competitor’s moves, 
consumer trends, latest technology – and not only being focused on the “inside” - 
production efficiency, cost rationalization - to benefit of the perfect timing. 
Moreover, and although nowadays there are less face to face interactions in b2b 
context, in this situation I consider that it was fundamental to start and build 
relationships.  
Fisipe believed in its strengths and used them to approach market opportunities, 
(product quality, and flexibility, among others); nevertheless in face of an unfamiliar 
market, it was wiser to first acquire some knowledge on the field.  
The company in face of an adverse historical trend and business environment was able 
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